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Accounting Choices and the Legal Environment:
the Impact of the Ex Post Loss RuleI
Samuel T. Tan
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract
Using a landmark Supreme Court decision as a natural experiment, I examine the im-
pact of a fundamental requirement in securities litigation, the ex post loss rule, on income-
decreasing accounting choices. Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo (2005) established that
plainti↵s must show that the alleged misrepresentations caused an actual economic loss.
The case resolved a circuit split, allowing me to identify a treatment jurisdiction a↵ected by
Dura, and control jurisdictions in which the rule was already the prevailing legal standard.
Motivated by legal analyses suggesting that Dura incentivizes firms to delay negative correc-
tions, I hypothesize and find that treatment firms in high-litigation industries became more
likely to delay write-downs and income-decreasing accrual error reversals at the firm level
after Dura, relative to matched control firms. This paper sheds light on the relationship be-
tween securities law and accounting practices, and informs policy makers on the accounting
impact of a key feature of the legal environment.
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1 Introduction
“As one might expect, securities lawyers regularly counsel their clients that, if
they must disclose a piece of bad news, they should wait if necessary so as to be
able to release good news at the same time. Finally, when firms have bad news to
report that can be delayed no longer, they may as well report as much bad news as
possible. Dura’s elevation of the ex post loss rule may exacerbate such trends.”
(Spindler, 2007, p. 684-685)
“the US Supreme Court will hear what legal experts say is the most important
securities case in a decade.”
(Waldmeir, 2005, The Financial Times)
Accounting choices and disclosures play important roles in securities litigation: about
a third of securities class action lawsuits between 1996 and 2017 allege financial statement
misrepresentations, and almost a quarter allege GAAP or GAAS violations.1 In recent years,
for example, Harley-Davidson, HP, IBM, Xerox, and Yahoo! were sued following accounting
changes related to write-downs or working capital.2
In a securities class action lawsuit, the plainti↵ investors must demonstrate loss causation
by showing that the firm’s alleged misconduct caused a corrective disclosure that resulted
in a stock price decline. This is known as the ex post loss rule (see Spindler, 2007). This
rule links securities litigation inextricably with accounting because downward corrections
are fundamental to the accounting process. For example, accounting standards such as ASC
320 and ASC 350 generally require an impairment or further impairment tests when an
asset’s carrying value exceeds its fair value, and income-increasing working capital accrual
estimation errors should reverse downwards within a year at least at the transaction level
(Allen et al., 2013).
However, legal analysis suggests that the ex post loss rule increases incentives to withhold
or delay bad news. Spindler (2007) concludes that the rule incentivizes firms to “obscure
or delay negative information” (p. 656–657) because a turnaround in fortunes, news about
1Based on lawsuits recorded in Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database.
The database recorded over 4,700 lawsuits filed between 1996 and 2017.
2See In re Harley Davidson, 660 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Wis. 2009); In re HP Securities Litigation, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Int’l Ass’n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local
#6 Pension Fund, et al. v. IBM, et al., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120641 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Russell Carlson, et
al. v. Xerox, et al., 392 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D. Conn. 2005); Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement
System, et al. v. Xerox Corporation, et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28445 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Yahoo!, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113036 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
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other projects, or exogenous events can disrupt the causal link between alleged misconduct
and a price decline, or prevent a price decline altogether:
“A firm may choose to undertake multiple projects (e.g., conglomerate), and can
then lie about one of the projects in the hope that the other project will ultimately
make up for it. Similarly, exogenous events, such as market fluctuations, can
interrupt the chain of causation and deny plainti↵s a recovery. Or a firm may
fraudulently withhold news of bad performance in the hopes of turning it around
in the future, preventing an ex post market decline.” (Spindler, 2007, p. 657)
I argue in this study that the analysis in Spindler (2007) applies to the choice of rec-
ognizing required income-decreasing write-downs and accrual reversals, both of which can
trigger litigation but are subject to discretion at the firm level. Write-downs are subject to
managerial judgment for example in the estimation of asset fair values, and the literature
(see Allen et al., 2013) suggests that working capital accrual errors may not reverse within
one year at the firm level despite generally needing to do so at the transaction level. The
primary prediction of this study is therefore that the rule causes firms at high risk of litiga-
tion to delay write-downs and income-decreasing working capital accrual error reversals at
the firm level.
To identify the causal impact of the ex post loss rule on these accounting practices, I
exploit Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), henceforth Dura, a landmark
Supreme Court case that established the rule in one legal jurisdiction, with little or no
expected impact on most other jurisdictions. Before Dura, the Ninth Circuit did not require
plainti↵s in securities lawsuits to show that the firm’s stock price declined. Instead, it allowed
plainti↵s to plead that the firm’s misconduct caused stock prices to be artificially inflated at
the time they purchased the shares. In contrast, the majority of the circuit courts required
plaintifs to plead that the firm’s misconduct caused a price decline. In Dura, the Supreme
Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, establishing that a causal link between the misconduct
and a price decline is required in order to demonstrate loss causation. Dura was described by
the Financial Times as “the most important securities case in a decade” (Waldmeir, 2005);
I provide a summary of Dura and the lower court cases leading to it at Appendix A.
I use di↵erence-in-di↵erence designs to examine whether firms in the Ninth Circuit be-
came more likely to delay required write-downs and income-decreasing accrual error reversals
after Dura, relative to firms in control circuits. For the post-Dura period relative to the pre-
Dura period, and for treatment relative to control firms, I examine the extent to which a high
book-to-market predicts a write-down the following year, and the extent to which a highly
positive working capital accrual error predicts a highly negative working capital accrual error
2
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the following year. I find that firms in high-litigation industries in the Ninth Circuit became
more likely to delay required write-downs and income-decreasing working capital accrual
error reversals at the firm level after Dura relative to matched control firms. In addition,
when write-downs do occur, they are larger in treatment firms after Dura relative to control
firms, consistent with Spindler (2007, p. 684-685), who suggested that Dura may increase
delays of bad news until they “can be delayed no longer”.
In addition to sensitivity analyses, I carry out two falsification tests. First, I replicate
my analyses using an alternative Supreme Court decision, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007), henceforth Tellabs , that also a↵ected litigation in the
Ninth Circuit, but that concerned a di↵erent legal issue to Dura. Across specifications, I
find no evidence that Tellabs a↵ected the delaying of accounting corrections in a direction
that would falsify my interpretation of my main results. Second, I replicate my analyses
using firms not in high-litigation industries, and find no evidence that Dura had an e↵ect
on this sample. This is consistent with firms having less incentive to take potentially costly
actions to avoid litigation if they have a low probability of facing litigation in the first place.
By exploiting Dura’s resolution of a circuit split to examine the causal impact of the
ex post loss rule on accounting choices, my study contributes to the growing literature on
the impact of court rulings on financial reporting, and more generally to the literature
examining the relationship between the legal environment and accounting decisions (please
see Section 2 for a literature review). My study also contributes to the literature on litigation
risk and financial reporting. In particular, it builds on Watts’ (2003) influential litigation
explanation by providing evidence that in the current legal environment, managers attempt
to reduce the litigation costs of overstatements by disrupting the causal relationship between
the overstatement and a subsequent ex post loss. Finally, this paper informs academics,
policy makers, and practitioners by shedding light on how a feature of the legal environment
a↵ects accounting practices that are fundamental to GAAP.
2 Prior literature
In this study I contribute to two overlapping streams of research. The first is the growing
literature on the impact of court rulings on financial reporting, a rich arena for testing
fundamental questions at the intersection of accounting and law. The second is the literature
examining the relationship between litigation and financial reporting, particularly the stream
of research relying on the litigation explanation spelled out by Watts (2003)—the idea that
managers understate net assets because “expected litigation costs of overstatement are higher
than those of understatement” (p. 216).
3
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2.1 Accounting and changes in the legal environment
Both these streams of accounting research—the literatures examining court rulings and lit-
igation respectively—examine the relationship between the legal environment and financial
reporting. A firm’s legal environment is the all-encompassing “sea of law” through which it
navigates, as described by Edelman & Suchman (1997):
“Modern organizations are immersed in a sea of law. They are born through
the legal act of incorporation, and they die through the legal act of bankruptcy.
In between, they raise capital under securities law, hire employees under labor
and antidiscrimination law, exchange goods and services under contract law, de-
velop public identities under trademark law, innovate under patent and copyright
law, and engage in production under environmental, and health and safety law.”
(p. 480)
In particular, I have in mind what Edelman & Suchman (1997) call the facilitative facet of
the legal environment, in which the law “appears as a system of procedural rules” (p. 483)
that are exogenous to the firm.
Taking this definition of the legal environment to its broadest extent, the accounting
literature has long examined the relationship between financial reporting and the legal en-
vironment. The many streams of research examining accounting policies and methods are
of fundamental importance to the profession (e.g. Sunder, 1973; Biddle, 1980; Barth et al.,
1996; Beatty & Weber, 2006; Barth et al., 2012), as are the closely-related studies examin-
ing other regulatory changes, such as those introduced by the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (e.g. Johnson et al., 2001), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (e.g. Zhang, 2007; Cohen
et al., 2008) and the Dodd-Frank Act (e.g. Christensen et al., 2017).
The recent literature has also begun examining the impact of the microfoundations of the
legal environment, including individuals’ legal expertise (e.g. Krishnan et al., 2011), general
counsel (e.g. Hopkins et al., 2015), external counsel (e.g. Bozanic et al., 2016), and law firms
(e.g. Dechow & Tan, 2018). Krishnan et al. (2011) and Hopkins et al. (2015) respectively find
that financial reporting quality increases with audit committee legal expertise and decreases
with general counsel compensation. In particular, Hopkins et al. (2015) find evidence that
firms with highly-paid general counsel are significantly more likely to meet analysts’ forecasts
due to a change in the litigation reserve. Bozanic et al. (2016) find evidence that firms
involve external legal counsel in the SEC comment letter process to “resist disclosing new
information” (p. 4). Furthermore, in a recent study Shen & Tan (2018) find evidence that
resistance to the comment letter process varies between individual lawyers, and that measures
of resistance increase with the retention of external counsel formerly employed by the SEC.
4
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Finally, Dechow & Tan (2018) find that a company is more likely to backdate its stock
option grants if it is represented by a law firm that had backdating clients, suggesting that
the practice of stock option backdating spread via law firms.
A growing stream of research has also examined the impact of court rulings on accounting
decisions. Court rulings can have profound and sweeping e↵ects on the legal environment.
Decisions by the United States courts of appeals (that is, the circuit courts) can establish
legal precedent across multiple states at once, while Supreme Court decisions in turn often
resolve circuit splits, establishing precedent across one or more circuit courts’ jurisdictions at
once. Shapiro (2006) writes that the Supreme Court’s “primary mechanism for maintaining
uniformity is to resolve circuit splits—areas of law in which di↵erent federal courts of appeals
(and state supreme courts) disagree about what rule or standard governs. In resolving these
circuit splits, the Court often announces rules and standards to be applied by the lower
courts” (p. 272–273, internal quotation marks omitted).
Earlier accounting studies examining court rulings include Simon (1956), Little et al.
(1995), and Dhaliwal & Erickson (1998), and in recent years a growing number of studies have
exploited court rulings to answer questions at the intersection of accounting and law. Bliss
et al. (2018), for example, examine the impact of Dura on litigation outcomes from bundling
restatement news with other news, and their findings provide support for the arguments by
Spindler (2007) that motivate my study.3 Hopkins (2017) and Cazier et al. (2017) use In re
Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) as an exogenous shock to examine the impact
of changes in litigation risk on earnings management and non-GAAP reporting respectively.
Finally, Chy & Hope (2018) exploit court decisions that changed auditor legal liability to
examine the impact of auditor conservatism on myopic underinvestment in R&D.
2.2 Accounting and securities litigation
Litigation is “perhaps the most frequently studied aspect of the facilitative legal environ-
ment” (Edelman & Suchman, 1997, p. 485), and a large body of research examines the
relationship between securities litigation and financial reporting. I identify three major sub-
sets of this literature—studies that examine guidance, accounting quality, and conservatism,
respectively.
In one of the earliest empirical studies of the relationship between accounting and secu-
rities litigation, Kellogg (1984) found in a sample of accounting-related class action lawsuits
that stock returns were negative around and before the time of public discovery of the firms’
3See also Furchtgott & Partnoy (2015), a prior version of Bliss et al. (2018), that also examines the impact
of Dura on the propensity to bundle restatement news.
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misrepresentations. Kellogg (1984) therefore provided early evidence that bad news triggers
litigation, and the goal of much of the subsequent literature on the relationship between
accounting and litigation risk has been to examine the frequency, timing, and other charac-
teristics of disclosures that potentially trigger litigation.
2.2.1 Guidance
A large stream of research on accounting and litigation examines earnings guidance as a
determinant of shareholder litigation, supported by evidence on the high cost of negative
earnings news.
Skinner (1994), in particular, finds that highly negative earnings announcements are
more likely to be preempted by guidance than other earnings announcements, consistent
with managers using guidance to reduce litigation costs when earnings news is negative.4
However, early empirical studies found mixed evidence for a negative relationship between
guidance and litigation. Francis et al. (1994), for example, find in a sample of 45 shareholder
lawsuits triggered by negative earnings news that the defendant firms issued guidance in 28
of the cases, suggesting that guidance does not fully deter litigation. Francis et al. (1994) also
find that 46 of their sample of 53 firms at risk of litigation due to severe earnings and sales
declines did not provide guidance. Furthermore, Skinner (1997) finds that the timeliness of
earnings disclosure is positively related to litigation. More recent studies find support for
a negative relation between guidance and litigation (e.g. Field et al., 2005; Donelson et al.,
2012; Billings & Cedergren, 2015). Field et al. (2005), in particular, find that guidance is
negatively related to lawsuits when they use a simultaneous equations framework to control
for endogeneity, and after excluding dismissed lawsuits.
Several recent studies have also examined the consequences of litigation or litigation
risk on guidance (e.g. Rogers & Van Buskirk, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Billings et al.,
2016). Rogers & Van Buskirk (2009), for example, find evidence that the frequencies of
earnings-related conference calls and earnings guidance decrease after firms face securities
lawsuits. In addition, the literature has also examined the relationship between litigation and
disclosure tone: Rogers et al. (2011) find a positive relation between earnings announcement
optimism and litigation, and find evidence that plainti↵s target optimistic language, and
Cazier et al. (2016) find that tone is only associated with litigation risk for non-forward-
looking statements, consistent with safe harbor protection for forward-looking statements.
4Another interpretation Skinner (1994) o↵ered is that “managers may incur reputational costs if they fail
to disclose bad news in a timely manner.” (p. 39)
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2.2.2 Accounting quality
Next, a line of research has examined the relationship between accounting quality and lit-
igation risk; for example, DuCharme et al. (2004), Gong et al. (2008), Grimm (2009), and
Chalmers et al. (2012) find evidence suggesting that litigation risk increases with abnormal
accruals or decreases with accruals quality.
DuCharme et al. (2004) find that abnormal accruals in the year prior to a secondary equity
o↵ering are higher in firms that are eventually sued in relation to their o↵erings, relative to
firms that are not. Gong et al. (2008) find, in the context of merger announcements, that the
market does not fully price the variation in litigation risk attributable to abnormal accruals
and other observables. And more recently, Chalmers et al. (2012) find that firms facing
securities lawsuits related to financial reporting have significantly lower accruals quality in
the four quarters before the sued quarter, relative to matching observations.
2.2.3 Conservatism
Finally, a line of research examines the relationship between litigation and conservatism.
Basu (1997, see p. 26–30) provided initial evidence by showing that conditional conservatism
is greater in periods of high auditor legal liability, and Watts (2003) subsequently spelled
out a litigation explanation for conservatism:
“Since the expected litigation costs of overstatement are higher than those of
understatement, management and auditors have incentives to report conservative
values for earnings and net assets.” (p. 216)
Motivated in part by Watts (2003), the subsequent literature has found that conservatism
is increasing in litigation risk at the firm level (e.g. Qiang, 2007; Khan & Watts, 2009), and
that firms with greater conditional conservatism have more favorable litigation outcomes
(Ettredge et al., 2016). Furthermore, in a well-identified cross-country study, Huijgen &
Lubberink (2005) find that conservatism is greater in the jurisdiction with greater exposure
to legal liability, consistent with the litigation explanation for conservatism.
Conceptually, my paper builds on Watts’ (2003) litigation explanation. I explain that
in the current legal environment, it is the ex post loss when an overstatement is corrected
that gives rise to the litigation costs borne by defendants, and not the overstatement per
se (see Section 3.1). I next present arguments due to Spindler (2007) that the costs of an
overstatement may not be fully internalized if managers can distort the causal relationship
between the overstatement and a price decline (Section 3.2). My empirical tests then examine
whether there is evidence that firms use accounting choices to distort the causal relationship
between overstatements and ex post losses.
7
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3 Legal background
3.1 The circuit split in the interpretation of loss causation
In securities class action lawsuits, plainti↵s are required to demonstrate loss causation—that
is, that the defendant’s violation caused the plainti↵’s loss. The requirement was codified in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, henceforth PSLRA:
“the plainti↵ shall have the burden of proving that the act or omission of the
defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for which the plainti↵
seeks to recover damages.” (15 U.S.C. §78u-4(b)(4))5
Despite the PSLRA’s codification of the requirement of loss causation, until the Dura decision
in 2005, the United States Courts of Appeals (that is, the circuit courts) were divided in
their interpretations of the requirement. Please see Appendix B for a map showing the
jurisdictions of each of the circuit courts.
The di↵ering interpretations of loss causation can be divided into a majority view—the
interpretation held by the majority of circuits—and a minority view (see Esco↵ery 2000 and
Prezioso et al. 2004). The majority view held that loss causation was established only if
plainti↵s could demonstrate a causal link between the defendant’s misconduct and actual
economic losses to the plainti↵. In contrast, the minority view held that loss causation was
established if plainti↵s could demonstrate that the fraud caused the defendant’s stock price to
be inflated at the time of purchase. Spindler (2007) refers to the contrasting interpretations
as the ex post and ex ante loss rules respectively, similar to Ferrell & Saha (2007):
“Has not such an investor su↵ered a loss, in an economic sense, from the fraudu-
lent statement? The answer turns on whether one looks at the situation ex post
or ex ante” (p. 172).
By 2003, the minority view was held almost exclusively by the Ninth Circuit. In Broudo
v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), henceforth Broudo, the Ninth Circuit
a rmed that plainti↵s do not need to show a price decline in order to establish loss causation.
Instead, showing that the firm’s misconduct inflated stock prices at the time of purchase is
su cient:
5For detailed discussions on the legal context and rationale of, and the debate surrounding the PSLRA
see, for example, Avery (1996), Cox (1997), Fisch (1997), Walker & Seymour (1998), Zelensky (1998), and
Ramirez (1999). See also Black (1987), Merritt (1988), Kaufman (1991), and Esco↵ery (2000) for discussions
on the loss causation requirement and its development prior to the PSLRA.
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“Ninth Circuit cases hold that: in a fraud-on-the-market case, the plainti↵s es-
tablish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase
was inflated because of the misrepresentation.” (p. 934)6
The Ninth Circuit contrasted its view with the majority view, for example saying that “other
circuits [...] do require demonstration of a corrective disclosure followed by a stock price drop
to be alleged in the complaint.” (Broudo, footnote 4) Please see Appendix A for a summary
of Broudo, including background information on the case.
The defendants in Broudo appealed to the Supreme Court, who heard the case in Dura.
I also provide a summary of Dura at Appendix A. The Supreme Court argued in Dura that
the Ninth Circuit’s perspective was unique, and that “other Courts of Appeals have rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s inflated purchase price approach to proving causation and loss” (p. 344,
internal quotation marks omitted). In its decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Broudo. The Supreme Court held that it is insu cient for a plainti↵ only
to prove that the defendant’s security price was inflated at the time of purchase, arguing
that the plainti↵ “has su↵ered no loss” at the time of the transaction (p. 342), and that
“the Ninth Circuit’s holding lacks support in precedent” (p. 343). In addition, the Supreme
Court expressed agreement with the majority view, for example citing the plainti↵s’ “failure
to claim that Dura’s share price fell significantly after the truth became known” (p. 347).
The Supreme Court therefore resolved the circuit split, establishing definitively that
plainti↵s in securities class action lawsuits need to allege that the defendant’s violation
caused an actual economic loss to the plainti↵s. Dura was described as “the most important
securities case in a decade” (Waldmeir, 2005). The courts began applying the ex post loss
rule immediately, interpreting the rule to mean that a stock price decline is required: “cases
[since Dura] appear to be almost universally in line with the interpretation that Dura requires
a market decline” (Spindler, 2007, p. 671). Table 1 summarizes the legal environments pre-
and post-Dura by legal jurisdiction.
A counterargument, however, is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura could have
little impact since plainti↵s can allege a causal link between misconduct and price decline
even if it is not required. I test this argument empirically by examining whether litigation
declined in the Ninth Circuit after Dura: the extent to which litigation declined is an estimate
6Prezioso et al. (2004) point out that the Ninth Circuit had several decisions “that are consistent with
the majority view” (p. 9), but they note that the decisions were prior to Broudo. In the Broudo ruling, the
Ninth Circuit cited one of its prior decisions, the Second Circuit’s decision in Suez Equity , and the Eighth
Circuit’s decision in Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, 335 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2003) in support of its position on
loss causation. However, the Second Circuit clarified in 2003 (in Emergent) that Suez Equity was not in
support of the minority opinion, and an amicus brief for Dura characterized the Eighth Circuit’s position as
“less than clear” (Prezioso et al., 2004, p. 9).
9
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Table 1: Loss causation standards by jurisdiction before and after Dura
Jurisdiction Pre-Dura Post-Dura
Ninth Su cient to show price ! Must show causal link to
Circuit inflation on purchase actual economic loss
Majority Must show causal link to
opinion actual economic loss
Before Dura, the circuit courts were divided in their interpretations of the loss
causation standard in securities class action lawsuits. The Ninth Circuit held that
plainti↵s were only required to establish that the defendant’s stock price was in-
flated, while the majority opinion was that plainti↵s must demonstrate a causal
link between the misconduct and actual economic losses to the plainti↵. In Dura,
the Supreme Court agreed with the majority opinion. Please see Appendix B for a
map showing the jurisdiction of each circuit court.
of the likelihood that shareholders in the pre-Dura regime brought litigation without relying
on a causal link from misconduct to a corrective disclosure. In Figure 1, I document that
the proportion of firm-years implicated in securities litigation declined after Dura from 6.5
percent to 3.9 percent (chi-squared p-value < 0.01) in high-litigation industries in the Ninth
Circuit, with no evidence for a statistically significant decline in control circuits or in other
industries.
3.2 Impact of the ex post loss rule on negative corrections
Dura sparked a series of studies in the legal academia that examine the legal context, po-
tential consequences, and criticisms of the decision (e.g. Fox, 2005; Dutton, 2006; Olazabal,
2006; Cross, 2007; Ferrell & Saha, 2007; Spindler, 2007). Spindler (2007), in particular, ar-
gues that the rule “fails to adequately internalize the costs of fraud onto the firm” (p. 657).
Given an overstatement, a firm can bundle the negative correction with other news, or an
exogenous event or turnaround in fortunes could occur. These can distort the causal rela-
tionship between the overstatement and subsequent price declines, or allow a firm to avoid
a price decline altogether. Without an ex post loss that is attributable to alleged fraud,
plainti↵s would not be able to successfully sue for damages.
Specifically, Spindler (2007) examines three settings—when a firm has multiple projects,
when exogenous events occur, and when there are multiple periods—and analyses in each
setting a hypothetical project with some probability of success (see p. 677–685). To summa-
rize his arguments, focusing on the case in which an overvalued project has failed and the
manager is contemplating a negative correction that could cause a stock price decline:
Multiple projects: The losses from the project’s failure can be made up by gains from
other projects, potentially avoiding ex post losses entirely. Even if multiple projects
10
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Figure 1: Impact of Dura on litigation
This figure documents the proportions of firm-year observations that were implicated in securities class
action lawsuits between fiscal years 2003 and 2005 inclusive, and 2006 and 2008 inclusive, for di↵erent
subsamples. The observations comprise Compustat firms headquartered in the United States and with state
data available. High-litigation industries and control circuits are as defined in the empirical analyses of this
paper (see Section 5.1). A firm-year is implicated in a securities class action lawsuit if the firm appears in
Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse database, and either the first or reference class
period overlaps with the fiscal year.
11
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fail su ciently for plainti↵s to su↵er ex post losses, determining the amount of damages
attributable specifically to the overstatement may be problematic.
Exogenous events: The correction can be bundled with a negative exogenous event, mini-
mizing legal liability. Because a firm is not liable for ex post losses that investors would
have su↵ered even in the absence of fraud, legal liability may be reduced if an exoge-
nous event occurred that would have caused a stock price decline even if the project
succeeded.
Multiple periods: If the project spans multiple periods, a negative correction in one period
can be delayed in order to bundle it with future information about the project: “the
marginal benefit of good news [in the second period] is quite high, because it reduces
fraud liability, whereas the marginal cost of additional bad news is zero, since the
loss causation rule limits fraud liability to the damages actually caused by the fraud.”
(p. 684)
Incentives to delay bad news over multiple periods are particularly important because firms
often have projects and assets that span multiple reporting periods. In his discussion of
the multiple-period setting, Spindler (2007, p. 684) in fact suggests examining whether the
likelihood of delaying bad news varied by legal jurisdiction before the Dura decision unified
the circuits:
“It would be interesting to see whether evidence of delays is greater in jurisdic-
tions utilizing ex post loss causation rules prior to Dura. In any event, Dura
should exacerbate the tendencies to delay that already exist.”
Furthermore, he suggests that when the bad news can no longer be delayed, firms “may as
well report as much bad news as possible” (p. 685), consistent with big bath incentives.
To apply these arguments to accounting choices in broad terms (see Section 4 for a
detailed discussion), the ex post loss rule incentivizes managers to avoid or delay income-
decreasing reversals of inflated financials. For example, income-increasing working capital
accrual errors should reverse at the transaction level, but the reversals can be bundled with
other income-increasing working capital accruals at the firm level (e.g. Allen et al., 2013),
obscuring the impact of the reversal of the positive error specifically. In addition, assets like
goodwill span multiple fiscal periods, allowing managers to delay required write-downs until
they can be bundled with other news or until an exogenous event or a turnaround occurs.
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3.3 Supporting evidence and tension
The opinions of Dura and subsequent courts on loss causation, and some empirical evidence
from the literature, generally support the argument that the causal link between alleged
misconduct and a subsequent price decline can be distorted. In Dura itself the Supreme
Court discussed the strength of the relationship between inflated share prices and subsequent
price declines, noting that even if there is a price decline,
“that lower price may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, which taken separately or together
account for some or all of that lower price.” (p. 343)
Subsequent courts’ opinions support the arguments in Dura and Spindler (2007). To cite
several examples from dismissed lawsuits:
In Leykin v. AT&T Corp., 423 F. Supp. 2d 229 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the court dismissed the
complaint in part because the plainti↵s did not show that the price decline was due
to the alleged misconduct rather than an industry-wide price decline, illustrating the
point that defendants are not liable for ex post losses that investors would have faced
in the absence of fraud.
In Lattanzio v. Deloitte, 476 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2007), the Second Circuit said that the
plainti↵s would have had to allege facts that allow “some rough proportion” (p. 26) of
the ex post loss to be attributed to the defendant’s misstatements, as opposed to the
misstatements by another party.
In Wilamowsky v. Take-Two, 818 F. Supp. 2d 744 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), the court said that
in order for the plainti↵ to rely on certain misstatements to show loss causation, he
would have had “to disaggregate their impact on his loss from prior misstatements and
legitimate news a↵ecting Take-Two stock prices” (p. 34)
In Kuriakose v. Freddie Mac, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34285 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), the court
said that “there is a decreased probability that Plainti↵s’ losses were caused by fraud”
(p. 42) because the defendant’s stock was “clearly linked” to marketwide conditions.
These cases support the idea that under the ex post loss rule, loss causation requires price
declines to be disentangled from marketwide conditions and other news.7
7I note, as a caveat, that these cases were not dismissed on the basis of loss causation alone.
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The argument in Spindler (2007) that bundling bad news with other information reduces
legal liability is also supported empirically in the restatements setting. The findings in Bliss
et al. (2018) suggest that bundling of restatement disclosures with other pieces of information
became more e↵ective at reducing post-restatement litigation cost after Dura. In addition,
a prior version of Bliss et al. (2018) using a narrower definition of bundling, Furchtgott
& Partnoy (2015), shows that firms became more likely to bundle restatement disclosures
after Dura (see Table 6). Intriguingly, however, another recent study found some evidence
to the contrary. Donelson & Hopkins (2016) show that the courts do not fully disentangle
large market declines and the impact of firm-specific news: they find that litigation and
settlements after earnings disclosures are more likely when the disclosures occurred during
large short-window market declines. This suggests that bundling with other bad news may
in fact increase litigation risk. Furthermore, additional tests in Donelson & Hopkins (2016)
suggest that this phenomenon may be driven by judicial expertise: when a judge has more
specialized experience in securities litigation, large market declines are more likely to lead
to dismissals, and vice versa.
The results in Donelson & Hopkins (2016) highlight an area of tension in motivating
this study: that the justice system is not perfect. In a study of district and appellate court
civil cases over 1988 to 2000, Eisenberg (2004) finds that 21 percent of cases with definitive
judgments are appealed, and that defendants achieve reversals about 40 percent of the time
if the appeal is not settled or withdrawn. These figures indicate that mistakes (at least by
district courts) are not uncommon. A manager making a costly accounting choice to avoid
a lawsuit would therefore have to consider the possibility of being sued anyway, and of the
suit not being dismissed despite his or her best e↵orts.
An additional layer of tension is that delaying bad news may itself increase litigation costs
in the long run if a lawsuit is not successfully avoided or dismissed. An exogenous event
or a turnaround of fortunes may not happen, for example. Delaying a correction increases
litigation risk because it is likely to lengthen the time during which the firm’s stock price
was allegedly inflated by misconduct. This increases the number of statements that would
be scrutinized for misrepresentations, and increases the number of putative class members.
Field et al. (2005) writes, for example, that the “longer the stock trades at too high a price,
the greater the potential damages from a lawsuit and the more likely the firm is to be sued”
(p. 496, internal quotation marks omitted).
As a counterargument, however, Spindler (2007) suggests that it is commonplace for
lawyers to recommend delaying bad news, suggesting that the benefits to the firm of delaying
must usually outweigh the costs:
“As one might expect, securities lawyers regularly counsel their clients that, if
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they must disclose a piece of bad news, they should wait if necessary so as to be
able to release good news at the same time.” (p. 684)
Given the legal and empirical evidence for and against, whether managers exploit the ex post
loss rule a rmed by Dura, and if so, to what extent, are empirical questions.
4 Hypothesis development
My overall research question is whether the ex post loss rule incentivizes firms at high risk
of litigation to withhold or delay income-decreasing accounting choices. Specifically, I hy-
pothesize that firms in highly-litigated industries in the legal jurisdiction most a↵ected by
Dura—the Ninth Circuit—became more likely to delay write-downs and downward accrual
error reversals at the firm level after Dura, relative to control firms.
My hypotheses are motivated primarily by the arguments in Spindler (2007) suggesting
that under an ex post loss regime, managers can reduce the costs of overstated financial
results by distorting the causal relationship between the overstatement and subsequent price
declines. As discussed in detail in Section 3.2, this distortion can be achieved by bundling
downward corrections with other news, by the impact of exogenous events, or by withholding
bad news in the hopes of a positive turnaround. In an ex ante loss regime, in contrast, these
actions would be less e↵ective at reducing litigation risk because plainti↵s are able to show
loss causation on the basis of the alleged overstatement.
Dura would therefore have an impact on income-decreasing accounting choices that are
closely linked to prior periods of observably inflated financials. In addition, Dura would have
an impact on income-decreasing accounting choices that are expected to lead to litigation,
but that are subject to managerial discretion.
4.1 Write-downs
GAAP rules require that “most non-financial assets must be written down when their fair
values drop su ciently below their carrying values” (Lawrence et al., 2013, p. 112). For
example, accounting standards such as ASC 320 Investments–Debt and Equity Securities
and ASC 350 Intangibles–Goodwill and Other generally require an impairment or further
impairment tests when an asset’s carrying value exceeds its fair value.
Write-downs are charged against earnings, and frequently contribute substantially to
losses. Among loss firms over the past decade that recorded write-downs, the write-downs
accounted for more than half of losses in about 40% of cases, and were greater than total
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losses in about 20% of cases.8 Write-downs expose firms to securities litigation risk not only
because they contribute to losses, but in particular because they reveal that financial results
were inflated in the past. Companies that have been sued in recent years following write-
downs include HP, IBM, Xerox, and Yahoo!.9 In In re HP Securities Litigation, plainti↵s
sued HP after the firm announced an $8.8 billion impairment due in part to accounting fraud
inflating financial results.
Because a write-down is usually required when an asset’s fair value drops below its
carrying value, an asset book-to-market ratio above one—market-implied impairment—can
be used as an indicator that a write-down is very likely to be required.10 I note that market-
implied impairment is not necessarily grounds for litigation per se even if it is accompanied
by declining stock prices, and a book-to-market of less than one does not necessarily imply
that a write-down is not required. In In re HP Securities Litigation, for example, HP’s stock
price declined substantially after the acquisition of Autonomy, driving HP’s book-to-market
close to one, but shareholders sued only after the write-down announcement.
Finally, write-downs have long been known to be subject to managerial discretion (e.g.
Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Francis et al., 1996; Wilson, 1996; Ramanna & Watts, 2012; Lawrence
et al., 2013). Elliott & Hanna (1996) write that
“consistent with claims made in the business press, management might be using
write-o↵s to accomplish strategic earnings management objectives.” (p. 154)
Judgment is often required even within the constraints of GAAP, and even if strict fair value
tests are required. For example, SFAS 142 (now codified as ASC 350) requires goodwill
to be tested for impairment at least annually in two steps: first, potential impairment is
determined by comparing the fair value of a reporting unit with its carrying value; second,
the implied fair value of goodwill within the reporting unit is compared with its carrying
value (see FASB, 2001). Ramanna & Watts (2012) argue that managerial discretion exists in
8These statistics do not include write-downs recorded in cost of goods sold. These descriptives are based
on comparing the sum of non-goodwill pretax write-downs and impairments (wdp) and pretax goodwill
impairments (gdwlip) against net income (ni), for all Compustat firm-years with strictly negative ni and
strictly negative wdp or gdwlip between 2007 and 2016 inclusive. wdp and gdwlip are set to zero if missing
in Compustat.
9See In re HP Securities Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168292 (N.D. Cal. 2013), Int’l Ass’n of Heat
& Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers Local #6 Pension Fund, et al. v. IBM, et al., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
120641 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System, et al. v. Xerox Corporation,
et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28445 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), and In re Yahoo!, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113036
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
10Although the threshold may e↵ectively be slightly above one for certain assets for which the fair value test
is less stringent. See Lawrence et al. (2013, p. 115) for a summary of accounting principles on write-downs
by asset class.
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the allocation of goodwill to reporting units, the estimation of the reporting units’ fair values,
and the measurement of the fair values of net assets within reporting units.11 Furthermore,
Graham et al. (2005, see Table 6) find that 21.3% of CFOs surveyed would postpone taking
an accounting charge within the constraints of GAAP to meet an earnings target.
In summary, write-downs may trigger securities litigation, but are subject to managerial
discretion. The arguments in Spindler (2007) that the ex post loss rule may incentivize
managers to delay bad news therefore applies: by exercising discretion in delaying a required
write-down, a manager can wait for a positive turnaround (thus avoiding the write-down
entirely), or wait for additional value-relevant news that can be bundled with the write-
down announcement. My first hypothesis, stated formally in alternate form, is therefore as
follows:
Hypothesis 1. Firms at high risk of litigation under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit
became more likely to delay required write-downs post-Dura, relative to matching control
firms.
In addition, assuming that not all firms are able to delay a write-down indefinitely, a delay is
likely to lead to a larger write-down when it is eventually recorded. This would be consistent
with firms being able to delay write-downs only up to a point, or firms reporting “as much bad
news as possible” (Spindler, 2007, p. 685) by taking larger write-downs or by writing-down
more assets, once they are unable to delay a write-down.
4.2 Downward accrual error reversals
More generally, write-downs are reversals of positive accruals. An inventory write-down,
for example, is a correction of positive inventory accrual errors in the past, and goodwill
impairments reverse previously-recognized goodwill as its estimated fair value decreases.
My second set of tests focuses on downward reversals of working capital accrual estimation
errors. This provides additional evidence on the impact of the ex post loss rule because
income-decreasing changes in working capital can trigger litigation, but their e↵ect would
generally not be reflected in my tests of write-downs.12
As in the examples in Section 4.1 of lawsuits following write-downs, there are recent
examples of class action lawsuits following downward corrections related to working capital.
11In addition, ASU 2011-08 has introduced additional room for discretion by allowing managers to bypass
the two-step impairment test entirely depending on the outcome of a qualitative assessment.
12For example, inventory write-downs reverse inventory accruals (Allen et al., 2013), but would not be
tested under Hypothesis 1 because they are usually reflected in costs of goods sold (Lawrence et al., 2013).
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For example, Xerox was sued in 2000 after recording a $78 million charge in part for improper
recognition of uncollectible receivables, among other issues, and Harley-Davidson was sued
in 2005 for channel stu ng after it announced a reduction in production and shipment
targets.13
Accrual estimation errors “arise from lack of perfect foresight or from the application of
aggressive or conservative accounting mandated under generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples” (p. 118), or from earnings management. (Allen et al., 2013) Examining estimation
errors specifically in working capital accruals has the advantage that under the constraints
of GAAP they generally reverse within one year at the transaction level. This follows from
the definition of accrual estimation errors in Allen et al. (2013):
“An accrual estimation error is an ex post characterization of an accrual based
on the di↵erence between the accrual and the subsequently realized benefit.”
(p. 115)
Since the benefits of positive working capital accruals are intended to be realized within one
year, associated estimation errors should also reverse at the transaction level within a year.
This allows me to use a highly positive error in the previous year as an indicator that a
downward reversal is likely to be required in the current year.
While the estimation errors should reverse within one year at the transaction level, they
may not do so at the firm level. Allen et al. (2013, see Table 3, Panel B), for example, find the
surprising result that firm-level working capital accrual estimation errors—the component
of working capital accruals not attributable to growth or temporary fluctuations in working
capital requirements—are weakly positively autocorrelated. They suggest that the reversals
may be o↵set by new estimation errors, or simply that estimation errors “often take longer
than one year to reverse” (p. 115).
I therefore hypothesize that the arguments in Spindler (2007) apply to working capital
accrual estimation errors; specifically, that the ex post loss rule incentivizes managers to
bundle income-decreasing reversals with new income-increasing errors. This obscures the re-
lationship between inflated financial results in the previous period and downward corrections
in the current period, and potentially avoids a price decline, reducing the risk of litigation in
an ex post loss regime. My second hypothesis, stated formally in alternate form, is therefore
as follows:
13See Russell Carlson, et al. v. Xerox, et al., 392 F. Supp. 2d 267 (D. Conn. 2005) and In re Harley
Davidson, 660 F. Supp. 2d 969 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
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Hypothesis 2. Firms at high risk of litigation under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit
became more likely to delay required income-decreasing working capital accrual estimation
errors at the firm level post-Dura, relative to matching control firms.
I also examine the extent to which the impact of the ex post loss rule on the timeliness of
income-decreasing accrual error reversals drives its impact on overall accrual error reversals
(income-decreasing or income-increasing). This would provide evidence for a potential rela-
tionship between a key feature of the legal environment and overall accrual reversals, which
has been a focus of much of the prior literature on, for example, earnings management and
fraud detection (e.g. Dechow et al., 1995, 2011, 2012).
5 Research design
5.1 Treatment and control samples
I test Hypotheses 1 and 2 using regression models that exploit the fact that Dura reversed
the legal precedent of the Ninth Circuit. As discussed in Section 3.1, the split between
the Ninth Circuit and other circuits was evident by 2003, with the minority view on loss
causation being held almost exclusively by the Ninth Circuit. In Dura, the Supreme Court
ruled in favor of the majority view, reversing the Ninth Circuit and resolving the circuit
split.
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Cazier et al., 2017; Bliss et al., 2018), I assign firms to
Circuit Court jurisdictions based on the state in which the firm is headquartered. Appendix B
shows a map of states under each Circuit Court jurisdiction. The use of headquarters location
is grounded in legal reasoning: Cazier et al. (2017), for example, write that a suit filed outside
the district in which a firm is headquartered is “highly vulnerable” to dismissal or removal
to the headquarters district because
“Due to the nature of the specific types of claims in private securities class action
litigation and the fraud on the market presumption [...], substantially all of the
witnesses and evidence are likely to be located at the firms headquarters.” (p. 9)
Nevertheless, because Dura resolved a circuit split, there would be a bias against rejecting my
null hypotheses to the extent that firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit are expected to
be sued in control circuits, and vice versa, during the pre-Dura period. I examine this further
in untabulated analyses using data from Stanford’s Class Action Lawsuit Clearinghouse. I
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find that the substantial majority—about 91 percent— of lawsuits against firms located in
treatment or control states were tried in treatment or control states respectively.14
I therefore use firms headquartered in states under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit in
the treatment sample. I begin my analysis in 2003, the year the Ninth Circuit stated its legal
position on loss causation in Broudo and contrasted it with that of other circuits (as outlined
in Section 3.1). I define the pre-treatment period as 2003 to 2005 and the post-treatment
period as 2006 to 2008 in order to use the same number of years pre- and post-treatment.15
My control sample comprises firms headquartered in states under the jurisdictions of
all circuits other than the Eighth and Ninth Circuit. I omit firms under the Eighth Circuit
because there is disagreement over its legal position on the ex post loss rule. On the one hand
the Ninth Circuit cited the Eighth Circuit in support of its interpretation (Broudo v. Dura
Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 933, 9th Cir. 2003), but on the other hand an amicus brief for
Dura authored in part by the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Solicitor General Counsel of Record of the Department of Justice stated that “the
Eighth Circuit’s position on this issue is less than clear” (Prezioso et al., 2004, p. 9).
I restrict the samples to firms in highly litigated industries, defined based on data on
securities lawsuit filings by industry prior to Dura, and industry definitions from the prior
literature (e.g. Francis et al., 1994; Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Kim & Skinner, 2012; Donel-
son & Hopkins, 2016). Specifically, the high-litigation industries are biotechnology (SIC
codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734); computer manufacturing and software (SIC 3570–3577
and 7370–7374); electronics manufacturing (SIC 3600–3674); and telecommunications and
electric services (SIC 4810–4813, 4911, and 4931). Please see Appendix C for further discus-
sion, including details on industry representation in securities lawsuit filings prior to Dura,
and the probability of securities litigation by industry.
5.2 Testing Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 concerns the timing of required asset write-downs; in other words I need to
examine the changes in the likelihood of a write-down conditional on a write-down being
14Based on lawsuit filings in the three years pre-Dura with recent Compustat data available. The pro-
portion is even higher (about 93%) for firms in control states, despite the reduced hurdles to plainti↵s in
the treatment jurisdiction pre-Dura. For analyses in the legal literature on lawsuit filing location, see, for
example, Cox et al. (2009) and Cain & Solomon (2015).
15 Dura was decided in April 2005, which would have been in the second or fourth quarter of fiscal 2005
for most firms. If firms changed their accounting policies immediately, within fiscal 2005 itself, as a result
of the decision, this would bias against rejecting my null hypotheses. In sensitivity analyses described in
Sections 7.3 and 8.3, I replicate my main tests using two-year windows, 2003-2004 and 2006-2007, and find
that my main inferences are unchanged.
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required.
My strategy is to examine the extent to which an asset book-to-market greater than
one predicts a write-down during the year, because GAAP rules generally require a write-
down when an asset’s carrying value exceeds its fair value. However, there is some noise in
operationalizing this empirically because in the case of tangible assets, the threshold may
not be strict or Compustat may not capture the write-down separately.16 I mitigate this
potential source of noise by focussing on firms with material intangible assets when testing
Hypothesis 1. I also examine the impact of varying the threshold value in sensitvity analyses
at Section 7.3.
A highly positive relationship between write-downs and a high book-to-market in a firm
with material intangible assets indicates that the firm records GAAP-required write-downs
in a timely manner.17
The regression model for Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
logit(wddt) = ↵ +   ⇥ abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt +   ⇥  t + et (1)
where wddt is a dummy variable indicating a write-down during t, abtmdt 1 is a dummy
variable indicating an asset book-to-market ratio greater than one at the start of t, postt is a
dummy variable indicating the post-treatment period, treatt is a dummy variable indicating
firms in the Ninth Circuit, and  t is a vector of second-order interactions, main e↵ects, and
controls.
A significantly negative estimate of   would reject the null hypothesis, and I would
interpret this as evidence evidence that firms in the treatment sample avoid required write-
downs to a greater extent after Dura, relative to firms in the control sample.
Similarly, I examine the impact of Dura on the level of write-downs when they occur by
examining the relationship between the level of write-downs and the level of firms’ beginning
asset book-to-market, for firms that recorded a write-down. This model estimates the amount
of write-down a firm records, controlling for the extent to which its assets are overvalued
relative to the market.
16See Lawrence et al. (2013, p. 115-118) for a detailed analysis of GAAP rules and write-downs. Lawrence
et al. (2013) show that there is a nonlinearity in the relation between write-downs and book-to-market
ratios around a book-to-market ratio of one. They also show that the relationship between write-downs and
beginning book-to-market increases with intangibles intensity. See also Beaver & Ryan (2005) and Ramanna
& Watts (2012).
17In untabulated analyses, I find a significantly negatively average stock price reaction to earnings an-
nouncements in write-down quarters in my sample even when the asset book-to-market is greater than one
at the start of the year. This suggests that the market-implied impairment is incomplete on average, or that
the market overreacts to impairment announcements.
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The regression model is as follows:
wdt = ↵ +   ⇥ abtmt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt +   ⇥⇥t + et (2)
where wdt is the scaled level of write-downs at t, abtmt 1 is the asset book-to-market ratio
at the start of t, and ⇥t is a vector of second-order interactions, main e↵ects and controls.
Because write-downs are coded as negative values in Compustat, a significantly negative
estimate of   would indicate that treatment firms record larger write-downs relative to
beginning book-to-markets after Dura, relative to firms in the control sample.
5.3 Testing Hypothesis 2
To test Hypothesis 2, I examine the extent to which income-increasing accrual errors in the
previous period predict income-decreasing accrual errors in the current period.
Similar to Allen et al. (2013), I decompose working capital accruals into components
attributable to growth, temporary fluctuations in working capital requirements, and errors.
Please see Appendix E for details on the construction of the accrual error variables. I then
assign the signed error components for the current and previous years to quintiles, and
examine the extent to which high-quintile accruals in the previous year predict accruals in
the lowest quintile in the current year. I estimate two regression models for Hypothesis 2,
as follows:
logit(I(q acct = 1)) = ↵ +   ⇥ I(q acct 1   4)⇥ postt ⇥ treatt
+   ⇥ ⇤t + ✏t
(3)
logit(I(q acct = 1)) = ↵ +   ⇥ I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥ postt ⇥ treatt
+   ⇥ ⇤t + ✏t
(4)
where q acct is the quintile of the signed accrual error relative to the distribution at t, and
⇤t is a vector of second-order interactions, main e↵ects, and controls.
The estimates of   then measure the impact of Dura on income-decreasing accrual re-
versals. Specifically, it captures the likelihood that a firm records highly negative accruals
in the current year when accruals were highly positive in the previous year, relative to the
likelihood when accruals was not highly positive. This is important because the underly-
ing motivation of this study is that Dura incentivizes treatment firms specifically to avoid
corrective disclosures—disclosures that correct firm performance downwards.
Next I examine the impact of Dura on accrual reversals in general using the following
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regression model:
q acct = ↵ +   ⇥ q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt +   ⇥ ⇧t + ✏t (5)
where ⇧t is a vector of second-order interactions, main e↵ects, and controls. Significantly
positive estimates of   would suggest that relative to control firms, year-on-year accrual
reversals declined in treatment firms after Dura.
5.4 Matching methodology
I use two matching methods to control for di↵erences between the treatment and control
subsamples:
• Industry matching : The control group comprises all firm-years in the same high-
litigation industries as the treatment group.
• Propensity matching : The treatment and control observations are also from the same
industries, but they are propensity-matched each year to minimize the di↵erence in
estimated probability of treatment given a set of confounders.
The propensity matching is carried out in three steps. First, I use logistic regressions
to estimate the propensity that an observation is in the treatment subsample given a set
of potential confounding variables. Second, I discard treatment and control observations
that are outside the support of the propensity score. Third, I match treatment and control
observations using full matching (Rosenbaum, 1991).
For the write-downs analyses, I match along abtmt 1, intt 1, roat, log aget, log att 1,
log mvt 1 and two-digit SIC fixed e↵ects. Matching by intangibles intensity (intt 1) and
performance (roat) is particularly important since Lawrence et al. (2013) find that the re-
lationship between write-downs and book-to-market is more negative when intangibles in-
tensity is higher and performance is poorer; and matching by age (log aget) controls for the
possibility that accounting conservatism changes with firm age (e.g. as suggested by Khan
& Watts, 2009).
For the accruals reversals analyses, I match along acct 1, roat, growtht 1, ebtmt 1,
log aget, log mvt 1 and two-digit SIC fixed e↵ects. Matching by performance (roat) is par-
ticularly important due to the relationship between performance and accruals (e.g. Dechow
et al., 1995; Kothari et al., 2005), and matching by growth and age (growtht 1, ebtmt 1,
and log aget) controls for the potential relationship between accruals persistence and growth
23
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857703 
(e.g. Fairfield et al. 2003; see also Richardson et al. 2006).18
I match treatment and control observations using the full matching procedure introduced
by Rosenbaum (1991) (see also Rosenbaum, 2002; Hansen, 2004), which uses all available
observations to generate an optimal match between treatment and control groups. The
procedure “is optimal in terms of minimizing a weighted average of the estimated distance
measure between each treated subject and each control subject within each subclass.” (Ho
et al., 2011, p. 7).19
Specifically, the procedure matches treatment and control observations within subclasses
in which a treatment observation is matched to one or more control observations, or a control
observation is matched to one or more treatment observations. A set of weights is produced
that I use in the subsequent analyses. I show (in Table 4) that the di↵erences in mean
propensity of treatment each year becomes insignificant and close to zero after weighting,
I report the impact of the propensity matching on covariate balance at Table 5, and I use
weighted regressions when estimating the models under propensity matching.
6 Sample and descriptives
6.1 Sample selection
My sample period begins in 2003 and ends in 2008. As I discuss in Section 3.1, the split
between the Ninth Circuit and other circuits was clear by 2003, when the Ninth Circuit stated
its position in Broudo and contrasted it with the majority view. Beginning the sample in
2003 also allows me to avoid the impact of changes that may be attributable to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act or the adoption of SFAS 142 Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets. Using the
post-SFAS 142 period is critical because prior to the adoption of the standard (after March
15, 2001 for early adopters and after December 15, 2001 for other firms; see FASB, 2001,
p. 7), write-downs were rare because firms amortized intangible assets.20
Table 2 details the sample selection procedure of this study.21 Beginning with unique
Compustat firm-years between 2003 and 2008 inclusive, I require firms to be headquartered
18Please refer to Appendix D for variable definitions. I carry out the matching procedure after sample
attrition and after winsorizing. I winsorize accrual estimation errors at ±50%, and other non-discrete
variables are winsorized each year at the top and bottom percentiles.
19See also Hansen (2004, p. 609): “Among matching techniques for observational studies, full matching is
in principle the best, in the sense that its alignment of comparable treated and control subjects is as good
as that of any alternate method, and potentially much better.” I implement the propensity matching using
the MatchIt package (Ho et al., 2007, 2011) in R.
20In untabulated tests, I find that less than one percent of Compustat firm-years in the 1996 to 2000 period
recorded a write-down (negative wdp or gdwlip), compared to over 17 percent in the 2001 to 2005 period.
21Please see Sections 9.1 and 9.2 for details on the samples used in the falsification tests.
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in the United States and located in states in either the treatment or control jurisdictions.
The treatment sample comprises firms in states under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit,
and the control sample comprises firms in states under the jurisdictions of circuits other than
the Eighth or Ninth Circuit.22 I restrict the sample to firms in high-litigation industries as
defined at Section 5.1 (see also Appendix C). I also omit firms with beginning assets strictly
less than $1 million because Hypothesis 1 examines asset write-downs, and to reduce the
frequency of small denominators in the accrual measures used to test Hypothesis 2.
Panels B and C of Table 2 detail the further attrition steps specific to the write-downs
analyses and accrual reversals analyses respectively. For the write-downs analyses I require
firms to have material beginning intangibles, defined as beginning intangibles of at least
1% of beginning assets, because the fair value threshold for tangible asset write-downs may
not be strict, or Compustat may not capture their write-downs separately (see Section 5.2
for details). For each set of tests I require availability of key variables used in the main
and additional analyses. These steps result in a sample of 1,882 treatment firm-years and
3,499 control firm-years for the write-downs analyses and 2,383 treatment firm-years and
4,188 control firm-years for the accruals reversals analyses. These are the industry-matched
samples, in which treatment and control firm-years are from the same set of industries.
I construct the propensity-matched samples by applying the matching methodology de-
scribed in Section 5.4 to the industry-matched samples. Extreme treatment and control
observations—i.e. observations outside the support of the propensity score—are dropped,
resulting in a slight decline in the sample sizes for the propensity-matched sample. I apply
full matching (Rosenbaum, 1991), which results in a set of weights that are used in the
subsequent analyses. After propensity-matching, there are 1,854 treatment firm-years and
3,410 control firm-years for the write-downs analyses, and 2,359 treatment firm-years and
4,147 control firm-years for the accrual reversals analyses. I provide descriptive statistics
on the impact of the matching procedure on the propensity scores and covariate balance at
Section 6.3.
6.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 documents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main regression analyses.
Panel A is based on the sample used in the write-downs analyses. About 26 percent of the
firm-years recorded a write-down. The average write-down over all the firm-years is about
three percent of beginning market value, and among only the firms that recorded a write-
22I omit firms under the jurisdiction of the Eighth Circuit because there is disagreement over its legal
position on the ex post loss rule (see Section 5.1).
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Table 2: Sample selection
All Treatment Control
Firm-yrs. Firms Firm-yrs. Firms Firm-yrs. Firms
Panel A: Initial sample
Firm-years between 2003 and 2008 66,141 14,867 - - - -
US-headquartered & with state data 49,673 11,066 - - - -
Treatment & control jurisdictions 47,377 10,580 10,732 2,417 36,645 8,163
High-litigation industries 11,233 2,445 3,916 874 7,317 1,571
Minimum starting assets 9,621 2,187 3,348 774 6,273 1,413
Panel B: Write-downs sample
Initial sample of firm-years 9,621 2,187 3,348 774 6,273 1,413
Material starting intangibles 5,911 1,558 1,992 539 3,919 1,019
Require variable availability 5,381 1,415 1,882 513 3,499 902
Propensity-matched sample 5,264 1,397 1,854 506 3,410 891
Panel C: Accrual reversals sample
Initial sample of firm-years 9,621 2,187 3,348 774 6,273 1,413
Require variable availability 6,571 1,611 2,383 597 4,188 1,014
Propensity-matched sample 6,506 1,600 2,359 591 4,147 1,009
This table details the sample selection for the main tests of this study; please see Sections 9.1
and 9.2 for details on the samples used in the falsification tests. I begin with unique Compustat
firm-year observations between 2003 and 2008 inclusive that are headquartered (Compustat: loc)
in the United States and located in either the treatment or control jurisdictions. Treatment firms
are located in states (Compustat: state) under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, while control
firms are located in states under the jurisdictions of circuits other than the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. I then reduce the sample to firms in high-litigation industries—biotechnology (SIC
codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734); computer manufacturing and software (SIC 3570–3577 and
7370–7374); electronics manufacturing (SIC 3600–3674); and telecommunications and electric
services (SIC 4810–4813, 4911, and 4931)—and omit firms with beginning total assets (at) less
than $1 million. Panel B details the further sample attrition specific to the write-downs analyses.
I restrict the sample to firm-years with beginning intangibles (intan) of at least 1% of beginning
total assets, and require availability of variables used in the main regression analyses and abtmt
for the additional analyses. This results in an industry-matched sample of 5,381 firm-years; I
also construct a propensity-matched sample (see Section 5.4) comprising 5,264 firm-years. Panel
C details the further sample attrition specific to the accrual reversals analyses. After requiring
availability of variables for the main regression analyses the sample comprises 6,571 firm-years,
and the propensity-matched sample comprises 6,506 firm-years.
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down, the average write-down is about ten percent of beginning market value. The treatment
and control samples are significantly di↵erent along several variables; in particular, treatment
firms are younger, have higher valuations, and have lower intangibles intensity. The most
statistically significant di↵erence is in firm age: treatment firms have an average logged age
of 2.45 while control firms have an average logged age of 2.67, corresponding to 11.6 and
14.4 years respectively, and the di↵erence in means has a t-statistic of  13.32.
Panel B of Table 3 is based on the sample used in the accrual reversals analyses, and
documents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main regression analyses. The
average working capital accrual errors at the current and previous years are close to zero,
with treatment firms having only slightly more negative accrual errors than control firms.
Treatment firms are significantly larger and have significantly higher growth than control
firms: on average, treatment firms have sales growth of 27 percent and average logged market
values of 5.53, while control firms have sales growth of 20 percent and average logged market
values of 5.23. As in the write-downs sample, the most statistically significant di↵erence is
in firm age: on average, treatment firms have a logged age of 2.47 while control firms have
a logged age of 2.70, corresponding to 11.8 and 14.9 years respectively.
Panel C of Table 3 documents the mean current-year (t) and previous-year (t 1) accrual
errors within each quintile bin. For current-year accruals, the extreme quintile bins have
average working capital accrual errors of  14.3 percent and 12.4 percent respectively. For
previous-year accruals, the extreme quintile bins have average working capital accrual errors
of  14.8 percent and 13.0 percent respectively
6.3 Matching descriptives
6.3.1 Impact of matching on propensity scores
Table 4 summarizes the impact of the propensity matching procedure described at Sec-
tion 5.4. Each year I estimate the propensity that an observation is in the treatment sub-
sample given the potential confounding variables, and I drop treatment and control observa-
tions outside the support of the propensity score, resulting in slightly smaller samples: 5,264
firm-years for the write-downs analyses, and 6,506 for the accrual reversals analyses. I use a
full matching procedure (Rosenbaum, 1991) that weights the observations to minimize the
di↵erence in propensity scores.
Columns 2 to 5 of Table 4 document the di↵erences in mean propensity scores each
year between the treatment and control subsamples, after dropping observations outside the
support of the propensity scores each year but before weighting. The treatment firms have
significantly higher propensity scores every year as expected, with the estimated probability
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Write-downs sample
Pooled Treatment Control Di↵erence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T C t-stat.
wddt 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.02 1.23
wdt -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.003 -0.86
abtmt 1 0.57 0.31 0.55 0.31 0.57 0.31 -0.03⇤⇤⇤ -3.01
abtmdt 1 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27 -0.003 -0.37
intt 1 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.20 -0.01⇤⇤ -2.04
roat -0.15 0.43 -0.16 0.38 -0.15 0.45 -0.004 -0.34
log aget 2.59 0.64 2.45 0.55 2.67 0.67 -0.23⇤⇤⇤ -13.32
log att 1 5.18 2.29 5.20 2.14 5.16 2.36 0.04 0.66
log mvt 1 5.51 2.27 5.63 2.22 5.44 2.30 0.19⇤⇤⇤ 3.03
Firm-yrs. 5,381 1,882 3,499
Firms 1,415 513 902
Panel B: Accrual reversals sample
Pooled Treatment Control Di↵erence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T C t-stat.
acct -0.005 0.11 -0.01 0.11 -0.003 0.11 -0.005⇤ -1.69
acct 1 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 0.11 -0.004 0.12 -0.004 -1.47
roat -0.17 0.44 -0.17 0.40 -0.16 0.45 -0.01 -0.81
growtht 0.22 0.80 0.27 0.90 0.20 0.74 0.07⇤⇤⇤ 3.08
ebtmt 1 0.36 0.83 0.37 0.79 0.36 0.86 0.02 0.74
log aget 2.62 0.64 2.47 0.57 2.70 0.67 -0.22⇤⇤⇤ -14.39
log mvt 1 5.34 2.29 5.53 2.19 5.23 2.33 0.30⇤⇤⇤ 5.29
Firm-yrs. 6,571 2,383 4,188
Firms 1,611 597 1,014
Panel C: Accrual error quintiles
acct quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Observations 1, 314 1, 315 1, 313 1, 315 1, 314
Mean acct -0.143 -0.026 -0.001 0.023 0.124
acct 1 quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Observations 1, 314 1, 315 1, 313 1, 315 1, 314
Mean acct 1 -0.148 -0.029 -0.003 0.024 0.130
Panels A and B of this table document descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
main regression analyses, for the write-downs analyses and the accrual reversals analyses
respectively. The accrual error variables are winsorized at ±50 percent and other non-discrete
variables are winsorized each year at the top and bottom percentiles. The last two columns
document the di↵erence in means between treatment and control firms, with p-values labeled
as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01. Panel C documents the average current-year (t)
and previous-year (t   1) accrual errors within quintile bins, based on the accrual reversals
sample.
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Table 4: Impact of propensity matching
Panel A: Write-downs analyses (N = 5,264)
Mean unweighted propensity scores (%) Mean weighted propensity scores (%)
Year Treatment Control T   C t-stat. Treatment Control T   C t-stat.
2003 39.53 32.24 7.29⇤⇤⇤ 8.03 39.53 39.54 -0.01 -0.01
2004 41.45 31.76 9.69⇤⇤⇤ 9.25 41.45 41.46 -0.01 -0.01
2005 40.46 32.02 8.44⇤⇤⇤ 9.15 40.46 40.47 -0.01 -0.01
2006 40.86 31.01 9.85⇤⇤⇤ 9.22 40.86 40.84 0.02 0.02
2007 42.72 33.33 9.38⇤⇤⇤ 8.51 42.72 42.69 0.03 0.03
2008 42.05 31.70 10.35⇤⇤⇤ 9.03 42.05 42.05 0.003 0.003
Pooled 41.16 32.00 9.16⇤⇤⇤ 22.59 41.16 41.13 0.04 0.01
Panel B: Accrual reversals analyses (N = 6,506)
Mean unweighted propensity scores (%) Mean weighted propensity scores (%)
Year Treatment Control T   C t-stat. Treatment Control T   C t-stat.
2003 41.18 33.20 7.99⇤⇤⇤ 10.09 41.18 41.17 0.02 0.02
2004 41.94 32.24 9.69⇤⇤⇤ 10.63 41.94 41.97 -0.03 -0.03
2005 42.91 32.41 10.49⇤⇤⇤ 10.80 42.91 42.91 -0.001 -0.001
2006 41.95 33.21 8.74⇤⇤⇤ 9.53 41.95 41.96 -0.01 -0.01
2007 42.91 32.72 10.19⇤⇤⇤ 10.14 42.91 42.93 -0.02 -0.02
2008 43.14 33.46 9.68⇤⇤⇤ 9.57 43.14 43.14 -0.01 -0.01
Pooled 42.29 32.86 9.43⇤⇤⇤ 25.91 42.29 42.29 0.001 -0.02
This table documents the impact of the propensity matching procedure described at Section 5.4.
Each year I estimate the propensity that an observation is in the treatment subsample using a
logit model with predictors as listed in Section 5.4. Each year, extreme treatment and control
observations, i.e. those outside the support of the propensity score, are dropped. I use a full
matching procedure (Rosenbaum, 1991) that weights the observations to minimize the di↵erence in
propensity scores. The columns on the left document the di↵erences in propensity scores each year
after dropping extreme observations but before weighting, and the columns on the right document
the di↵erences in propensity scores each year after applying the weights. I document the t-statistics
for the di↵erences in mean propensity score each year, and the t-statistic for the pooled sample is
adjusted for year fixed e↵ects. The p-values of the t-tests of the di↵erences in propensity scores are
labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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of treatment about seven to ten percentage points higher in the treatment subsamples each
year. Columns 6 to 9 of Table 4 report the same statistics after applying the weights from
the matching procedure to each observation. Across all years the di↵erence in propensity
scores between the treatment and control subsamples become insignificant; in fact the mean
propensity scores become almost identical each year.
6.3.2 Covariate balance
While the preceding subsection (Section 6.3.1) showed that the propensity matching proce-
dure resulted in near-identical average propensity scores between the treatment and control
subsamples, there may still be some imbalance in individual covariates.
I report the impact of the matching procedure on covariate balance at Table 5. For each
variable I report the treatment and control subsample means respectively, and the di↵erence
between the treatment and control subsample means. The columns on the left are based on
the sample before matching, and the columns on the right are based on the sample after
matching, with weights applied according to the matching procedure. I report the statistics
for all variables used in the matching models, omitting industry fixed e↵ects for brevity.
I assess covariate balance using the absolute standardized di↵erence in means between
the treatment and control subsamples, pooled over all years.23 As in Ho et al. (2011), the
standardized di↵erence in means is defined as the di↵erence in means scaled by the standard
deviation in the treated subsample. I use an absolute standardized di↵erence of 25 percent as
a cuto↵ beyond which the amount of remaining bias is unacceptably large (e.g. Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1985, p. 37).
Panel A of Table 5 reports the covariate balance for the write-downs sample. The largest
absolute standardized di↵erence is in log aget, 41.05 percent, substantially larger than the
cuto↵ of 25 percent. In other words, the di↵erence in logged age between the treatment and
control subsamples is almost half of the standard deviation in the treatment subsample. The
other covariates have absolute standardized di↵erences below nine percent. After matching,
the absolute standardized di↵erence for log aget decreases from 41.05 percent to 8.68 percent,
and all other covariates have absolute standardized di↵erences of less than five percent.
Panel B of Table 5 reports the covariate balance for the accrual reversals sample. As in
Panel A, the largest absolute standardized di↵erence is in log aget, at 39.44 percent, larger
than the cuto↵ of 25 percent. log mvt 1 also has a relatively large absolute standardized
23In general, using t-statistics to assess covariate balance is “highly misleading” (Ho et al., 2011, p. 4).
See Imai et al. (2008, p. 495–498) for a detailed discussion of the balance test fallacy in using hypothesis
tests, and t-tests in particular, in balance assessment.
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di↵erence of 13.89 percent. After matching, the absolute standardized di↵erence for log aget
and log mvt 1 decrease to 7.58 percent and 4.38 percent respectively, and all other variables
have absolute standardized di↵erences of less than six percent.
Table 5: Covariate balance before and after matching
Panel A: Write-downs sample
Covariate means before matching Covariate means after matching
Treatment Control T   C |T C  | Treatment Control T   C |T C  |
abtmt 1 0.55 0.57 -0.03 8.60% 0.55 0.55 -0.002 0.59%
intt 1 0.23 0.24 -0.01 5.94% 0.23 0.24 -0.01 3.95%
roat -0.16 -0.15 -0.004 1.04% -0.16 -0.17 0.01 3.95%
log aget 2.45 2.67 -0.23† 41.05% 2.46 2.41 0.05 8.68%
log att 1 5.20 5.16 0.04 1.96% 5.19 5.09 0.10 4.46%
log mvt 1 5.63 5.44 0.19 8.77% 5.61 5.51 0.10 4.45%
Firm-yrs. 1,882 3,499 1,854 3,410
Firms 513 902 506 891
Panel B: Accrual reversals sample
Covariate means before matching Covariate means after matching
Treatment Control T   C |T C  | Treatment Control T   C |T C  |
acct 1 -0.01 -0.004 -0.004 3.79% -0.01 -0.01 0.0002 0.16%
roat -0.17 -0.16 -0.01 2.20% -0.17 -0.19 0.02 5.52%
growtht 0.27 0.20 0.07 7.46% 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.70%
ebtmt 1 0.37 0.36 0.02 1.96% 0.37 0.37 0.01 1.05%
log aget 2.47 2.70 -0.22† 39.44% 2.48 2.44 0.04 7.58%
log mvt 1 5.53 5.23 0.30 13.89% 5.51 5.42 0.10 4.38%
Firm-yrs. 2,383 4,188 2,359 4,147
Firms 597 1,014 591 1,009
Panels A and B of this table document the covariate balance before and after the propensity
matching procedure described at Section 5.4. For each variable I report treatment and con-
trol means, the di↵erence in means, and the absolute standardized di↵erence in means. The
standardized di↵erence in means is defined as the di↵erence in means scaled by the standard
deviation in the treatment subsample. The columns on the left report the statistics before
matching. The columns on the right report the statistics after matching, using means and
standard deviations weighted according to the matching procedure. The di↵erence in means is
labeled with † if the absolute standardized di↵erence is greater than 25 percent.
7 Write-downs
7.1 Delaying of write-downs
The results from estimating Equation 1 are documented at Table 6. Columns (1) to (3)
are based on the industry-matched sample, while columns (4) to (6) incorporate propensity
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matching. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate Equation 1 within the pre- and post-
Dura periods respectively after omitting the postt dummy. In the regressions with propensity
matching I use quasibinomial logistic models weighted according to the matching procedure
described in Section 5.4.24
The significantly negative coe cient estimates for abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt in columns
(3) and (6) suggest that treatment firms become more likely to delay write-downs after Dura
relative to control firms. The estimated e↵ect is also highly significant economically. From
the estimates after propensity matching in column (6), for example, the coe cient of  1.074
corresponds to about a 65.8% decline (1 e 1.074) in the odds of a write-down, ceteris paribus.
The significantly positive coe cient estimates for abtmdt 1 ⇥ treatt in columns (1) and
(4)—the pre-Dura period—suggest that before Dura, write-downs were more timely in the
Ninth Circuit relative to control circuits. This is consistent with the circuit split before
Dura: the ex post loss rule was the prevailing legal standard in the control circuits but not
the Ninth Circuit before Dura, so firms in control circuits would have greater incentive to
delay write-downs in order to disrupt the causal link between alleged misconduct and a price
decline. From column (4), the coe cient of 0.597 corresponds to about 81.7% higher odds
(e0.597   1) of recording a write-down.
Figure 2 illustrates the main results documented at Table 6 by plotting the di↵erence
in the timeliness of write-downs between treatment and control firms—i.e. the coe cient on
abtmdt 1 ⇥ treatt when Equation 1 is estimated without postt—for specific time periods.
Specifically, Panels A and B correspond to Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 6, and
illustrate the decline in timeliness of write-downs between the pre- and post-Dura periods
in treatment firms relative to control firms. Panels C and D show the treatment-control
di↵erence within each year, and show a large decline in the timeliness of write-downs for
treatment relative to control firms after 2005.
Other significant coe cients in Table 6 suggest changes in certain subsamples around
Dura. The increase in the coe cient on abtmdt 1 after Dura suggest that the timeliness of
write-downs in control firms increased, and the increase in the coe cient on treatt after Dura
suggests that the odds of writing down when book-to-market is low increased in treatment
relative to control firms. In untabulated analyses, I find evidence that these are driven
substantially by 2008, the final year in the sample, and are therefore likely to be related to
the financial crisis. Specifically, write-downs conditional on a high book-to-market increased
markedly in 2008 for both treatment and control firms, and write-downs when beginning
24Using a quasibinomial distribution generalizes the logistic model by allowing for the variance of the
dependent variable to be greater than what would be expected from binomial data (see McCullagh & Nelder,
1989).
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Table 6: Odds of writing down and beginning book-to-market
Dependent variable: wddt
Model: Logistic (binomial) Logistic (quasibinomial)
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
abtmdt 1 ⇥ treatt 0.695⇤⇤  0.234 0.689⇤⇤ 0.597⇤⇤  0.469 0.602⇤⇤
(0.292) (0.418) (0.292) (0.299) (0.421) (0.299)
abtmdt 1 0.039 0.664⇤⇤⇤  0.047  0.023 0.786⇤⇤⇤  0.063
(0.199) (0.241) (0.191) (0.205) (0.245) (0.196)
treatt  0.169 0.177⇤  0.178⇤  0.135 0.333⇤⇤⇤  0.141
(0.108) (0.107) (0.105) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt  0.871⇤  1.074⇤⇤
(0.500) (0.504)
abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt 0.931⇤⇤⇤ 1.144⇤⇤⇤
(0.288) (0.289)
postt ⇥ treatt 0.372⇤⇤⇤ 0.470⇤⇤⇤
(0.143) (0.145)
postt  0.064  0.172⇤
(0.086) (0.089)
Year FEs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,793 2,588 5,381 2,742 2,522 5,264
McFadden R2 0.075 0.103 0.079 0.087 0.106 0.081
Nagelkerke R2 0.120 0.165 0.127 0.139 0.169 0.130
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 1. I estimate the model using
logistic regressions, and I use a quasibinomial distribution for the propensity-matched
regressions. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate the model for specific time
periods. The control variables are intt 1, roat, log aget, log att 1, and log mvt 1, and
variable definitions are at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
the p-values are labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Figure 2: Write-downs and book-to-market, treatment-control di↵erence
This figure illustrates the results documented at Table 6 by plotting the coe cient of abtmdt 1 ⇥ treatt
when Equation 1 is estimated within specific time periods without postt. A coe cient of   implies that the
increase in the odds of writing down when a firm’s starting book-to-market becomes greater than one is e 
times as much in a treatment firm relative to a control firm, on average. Panels A and B correspond to the
results at Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 6, and examine the coe cients within the Pre and Post
periods respectively. For Panels C and D I estimate Equation 1 each year without postt and without year
fixed e↵ects.
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book-to-market is low increased more in 2008 in treatment relative to control firms. In
untabulated sensitivity analyses that replicate the tests after omitting 2005 and 2008, I find
that my main inferences are unchanged. In this alternative specification, the coe cients
on abtmdt 1, treatt, abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt, and postt ⇥ treatt that are statistically significant in
Table 6 become smaller in magnitude and statistical significance. Please see Section 7.3 for
details on this and other sensitivity and additional analyses.
7.2 Level of write-downs when they occur
Next, I examine the impact of Dura on the level of write-downs that are recorded by esti-
mating Equation 2 for firm-years with write-downs (i.e. where wddt = 1). The results are
documented at Table 7. As in Table 6, columns (1) to (3) are based on the industry-matched
sample, while columns (4) to (6) incorporate propensity matching. In columns (1), (2), (4),
and (5), I estimate Equation 1 within the pre- and post-Dura periods respectively after
omitting the postt dummy. For the tests with propensity matching, I carry out the matching
methodology using only the observations with write-downs.
The significantly negative coe cient estimates for abtmt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt in columns
(3) and (6) suggest that write-downs by treatment firms became larger post-Dura relative to
control firms, for a given increase in beginning book-to-market. The e↵ect is highly significant
economically: the coe cient of  0.208 in column (6) corresponds to a 6.7 percentage point
increase in the level of write-downs as a percentage of beginning market value, per standard
deviation of beginning book to market.25
The significantly positive coe cient estimates for abtmt 1 ⇥ treatt in columns (1) and
(4)—the pre-Dura period—suggest that before Dura, write-downs were smaller relative to
beginning book-to-market, in the Ninth Circuit relative to control circuits. This is consistent
with the circuit split before Dura: because firms in control circuits had greater incentive to
delay write-downs, the write-downs are larger when they are eventually recorded: “when
firms have bad news to report that can be delayed no longer, they may as well report as
much bad news as possible.” (Spindler, 2007, p. 684-685)
7.3 Additional tests and sensitivity analyses
I next carry out a several additional tests and sensitivity analyses that I leave untabulated
for brevity. First, I replicate my estimation of Equation 1 using di↵erent book-to-market
25The standard deviation of abtmt 1 in the sample of firm-years recording a write-down is 0.323. Com-
pustat records write-downs (i.e. wdp and gdwlip) as negative values, so the economic significance of 6.7
percentage points is estimated as follows:  0.208⇥ 0.323⇥ ( 1) = 0.0672.
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Table 7: Level of write-downs when they occur
Dependent variable: wdt
Model: Ordinary least squares Weighted least squares
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
abtmt 1 ⇥ treatt 0.114⇤⇤⇤  0.032 0.113⇤⇤⇤ 0.138⇤⇤⇤  0.060 0.139⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.039) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.033)
abtmt 1  0.003  0.096⇤⇤⇤  0.051⇤  0.020  0.117⇤⇤⇤  0.087⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.036) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.026)
treatt  0.067⇤⇤ 0.009  0.068⇤⇤⇤  0.088⇤⇤⇤ 0.037  0.089⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
abtmt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt  0.144⇤⇤⇤  0.208⇤⇤⇤
(0.054) (0.053)
abtmt 1 ⇥ postt 0.009 0.039
(0.032) (0.032)
postt ⇥ treatt 0.072⇤ 0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.038)
postt  0.019  0.048⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.022)
Year FEs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 716 1,421 649 653 1,302
Adjusted R2 0.417 0.494 0.433 0.427 0.546 0.457
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 2 for observations where wddt =
1. I estimate the model using least squares, and I use weighted least squares for the
propensity-matched regressions. I apply the propensity matching within this smaller
sample where wddt = 1. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate the model for
specific time periods. The control variables are intt 1, roat, log aget, log att 1, and
log mvt 1, and variable definitions are at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses and the p-values are labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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threshold values when defining abtmdt 1. Under both the industry-matching and propensity-
matching methodologies, when the threshold is slightly less than one (0.9 or 0.95), the main
triple di↵erence coe cient becomes smaller in magnitude and insignificant at conventional
significance levels. This may be due to the introduction of excessive noise as more firms are
erroneously assumed to require write-downs under GAAP. In contrast, when the threshold
is slightly more than one (1.05 and 1.1), the coe cient becomes larger in economic and
statistical significance. This is consistent with GAAP rules allowing the carrying value of
certain assets classes to exceed their fair values, causing incentives to avoid GAAP-required
write-downs to apply only at higher thresholds for certain firms.26
Second, I replicate my tests using an alternative sample period: 2003 to 2004 as the
pre-Dura period, and 2006 to 2007 as the post-Dura period. The inferences under this
alternative specification are similar to that of the main tests and are generally more significant
economically. For example, the coe cients on abtmdt 1⇥postt⇥treatt are 1.301 and 1.602
under the two matching methods respectively, larger than  0.871 and  1.074 in the main
tests (see Table 6). Similarly, the coe cients on abtmt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt are larger under
the alternative specification than in the main tests (Table 7).
Third, I replicate the main tests of write-down timeliness (see Table 6) using an al-
ternative definition of write-downs that includes other special items. Specifically, for this
sensitivity analysis I define wddt as one if the firm recorded a write-down at t (as in my main
tests), or if the firm recorded negative special items (Compustat: spi < 0) at t. I drop firm-
years with missing special items in Compustat, resulting in a slight decline in the sample size.
In this sensitivity analysis, the coe cients on the triple interaction abtmdt 1⇥ postt⇥ treatt
remain significantly negative in both the industry-matched and propensity-matched sam-
ples, suggesting that treatment firms became more likely to delay write-downs or charges to
special items after Dura relative to control firms, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
Finally, I examine the impact of Dura on ending asset book-to-market ratios (abtmt)
as a proxy for the degree of asset overvaluation. During the pre-Dura period, the mean
ending book-to-market ratio is significantly lower for firms under the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit than for control firms. Ninth Circuit firms had an average book-to-market
of 51.1 percent, while control firms had an average book-to-market of 54.5 percent; the
di↵erence in means is statistically significant with a t-statistic of  3.15. This is consistent
with firms in the Ninth Circuit recording more timely asset write-downs than control firms
before Dura, as documented at Table 6. In the post-Dura period, while the average book-
26An example cited in Lawrence et al. (2013) is the case of property, plant, and equipment and intangible
assets with finite lives: “The carrying values of PP&E and finite-lived intangibles can therefore exceed their
fair values when the carrying value is determined to be recoverable.” (p. 15)
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to-market ratio increased in both treatment and control firms, there is no evidence for a
statistically significant di↵erence in mean asset book-to-market ratio between treatment and
control firms at conventional significance levels (t =  0.19).
8 Accrual reversals
8.1 Income-decreasing accrual error reversals
The results from estimating Equations 3 and 4 are documented at Tables 8 and 9 respectively.
Columns (1) to (3) are based on the industry-matched sample, while columns (4) to (6)
incorporate propensity matching. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate Equations 3
and 4 within the pre- and post-Dura periods respectively after omitting the postt dummy.
As in the write-downs analyses (see Section 7.1), in the regressions with propensity matching
I use quasibinomial logistic models weighted according to the matching procedure described
in Section 5.4.
The significantly negative coe cient estimates for I(q acct 1   4) ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt and
I(q acct 1 = 5) ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt in columns (3) and (6) of Tables 8 and 9 suggest that
treatment firms become more likely to delay income-decreasing accrual error reversals after
Dura relative to control firms. The estimated e↵ects are also highly significant economically.
The coe cient of  1.251 at column (6) of Table 8 corresponds to a 71.4 percent decline
(1 e 1.251) in the odds of a firm recording highly negative accrual errors, while the coe cient
of  1.131 at column (6) of Table 8 corresponds to a 67.7 percent decline (1  e 1.131) in the
odds.
In the regressions using the highest two starting accrual error quintiles as a proxy for
highly positive accruals (Table 8), the coe cient on I(q acct 1   4)⇥ treatt is significantly
positive in the pre-Dura period under both industry matching (column 1) and propensity
matching (column 4). When only the highest accrual error quintile is used (Table 8), the
corresponding coe cients are also positive, but are only significant statistically under propen-
sity matching. Under all specifications (columns 2 and 5 of Tables 8 and 9), the coe cients
on I(q acct 1   4) ⇥ treatt and I(q acct 1 = 5) ⇥ treatt are significantly negative in the
post-Dura periods.
The significantly positive coe cients on I(q acct 1   4) ⇥ treatt and I(q acct 1 = 5) ⇥
treatt in the pre-Dura period under propensity matching are consistent with firms in the
Ninth Circuit having less incentive to delay income-decreasing accrual error reversals before
Dura, and thus recording more timely downward reversals than matched control firms. Unlike
the write-downs tests, the significantly negative coe cients in the post-Dura period suggests
that the di↵erence between treatment and control firms is statistically significant in the
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Table 8: Downward accrual error reversals, highest two starting accrual quintiles
Dependent variable: I(q acct = 1)
Model: Logistic (binomial) Logistic (quasibinomial)
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(q acct 1   4) 0.392⇤⇤  0.678⇤⇤⇤ 0.392⇤⇤ 0.589⇤⇤⇤  0.687⇤⇤⇤ 0.582⇤⇤⇤
⇥treatt (0.189) (0.205) (0.189) (0.192) (0.206) (0.191)
I(q acct 1   4) 0.044 0.571⇤⇤⇤ 0.040  0.103 0.600⇤⇤⇤  0.126
(0.113) (0.127) (0.113) (0.117) (0.128) (0.116)
treatt  0.279⇤⇤ 0.384⇤⇤⇤  0.291⇤⇤  0.293⇤⇤ 0.455⇤⇤⇤  0.278⇤⇤
(0.127) (0.136) (0.126) (0.123) (0.134) (0.122)
I(q acct 1   4)  1.067⇤⇤⇤  1.251⇤⇤⇤
⇥postt ⇥ treatt (0.279) (0.280)
I(q acct 1   4) 0.537⇤⇤⇤ 0.742⇤⇤⇤
⇥postt (0.169) (0.171)
postt ⇥ treatt 0.681⇤⇤⇤ 0.717⇤⇤⇤
(0.181) (0.180)
postt  0.281⇤⇤  0.346⇤⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.114)
Year FEs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,544 3,027 6,571 3,514 2,992 6,506
McFadden R2 0.109 0.123 0.114 0.115 0.124 0.115
Nagelkerke R2 0.163 0.184 0.171 0.172 0.184 0.173
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 3. I estimate the model using
logistic regressions, and use a quasibinomial distribution for the propensity-matched re-
gressions. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate the model for specific time periods.
The control variables are roat, growtht, ebtmt 1, log aget, and log mvt 1, and variable
definitions are at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and the p-values
are labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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Table 9: Downward accrual error reversals, highest starting accrual quintile
Dependent variable: I(q acct = 1)
Model: Logistic (binomial) Logistic (quasibinomial)
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
I(q acct 1 = 5) 0.278  0.482⇤⇤ 0.287 0.442⇤⇤  0.696⇤⇤⇤ 0.439⇤⇤
⇥treatt (0.217) (0.230) (0.216) (0.223) (0.232) (0.221)
I(q acct 1 = 5) 0.309⇤⇤ 0.827⇤⇤⇤ 0.309⇤⇤ 0.229⇤ 1.098⇤⇤⇤ 0.209
(0.129) (0.140) (0.128) (0.137) (0.143) (0.135)
treatt  0.177 0.211⇤  0.194⇤  0.160 0.327⇤⇤⇤  0.149
(0.112) (0.121) (0.110) (0.108) (0.118) (0.108)
I(q acct 1 = 5)  0.766⇤⇤  1.131⇤⇤⇤
⇥postt ⇥ treatt (0.316) (0.320)
I(q acct 1 = 5) 0.525⇤⇤⇤ 0.925⇤⇤⇤
⇥postt (0.188) (0.194)
postt ⇥ treatt 0.417⇤⇤⇤ 0.467⇤⇤⇤
(0.160) (0.160)
postt  0.187⇤  0.266⇤⇤⇤
(0.100) (0.100)
Year FEs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,544 3,027 6,571 3,514 2,992 6,506
McFadden R2 0.111 0.129 0.118 0.116 0.137 0.122
Nagelkerke R2 0.166 0.191 0.176 0.175 0.202 0.183
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 4. I estimate the model using
logistic regressions, and use a quasibinomial distribution for the propensity-matched
regressions. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate the model for specific time
periods. The control variables are roat, growtht, ebtmt 1, log aget, and log mvt 1, and
variable definitions are at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and
the p-values are labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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opposite direction after Dura. This may be due to an overreaction to Dura by Ninth Circuit
firms.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the results documented at Tables 8 and 9 respectively by plot-
ting the di↵erence in the timeliness of income-decreasing accrual reversals between treatment
and control firms—i.e. the coe cients on I(q acct 1   4)⇥treatt and I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥treatt
when Equations 3 and 4 are estimated without postt—for specific time periods. Specifically,
Panels A and B of both figures correspond to Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Tables 8 and
9 respectively, and illustrate the decline in timeliness of income-decreasing accrual reversals
between the pre- and post-Dura periods in treatment firms relative to control firms. Panels
C and D show the treatment-control di↵erence within each year, and show a large decline in
the timeliness of write-downs for treatment relative to control firms after 2005.
Figures 5 and 6 provide additional details on the economic significance of Dura on accrual
reversals. These figures show the percentage of firms with highly positive accruals in the
previous year that are in each quintile of accruals in the current year. For example, in Panel
A of Figure 5, the top left data point indicates that in the pre-Dura period, about 24% of
treatment firms with highly positive accruals last year are in the lowest quintile of accruals
this year. Figure 5 is based on firm-years with previous-year accruals in the highest two
quintiles, while Figure 6 is based on the highest quintile. Panel A of both figures show that
in the pre-Dura period, treatment firms with highly positive accrual errors in the previous
year were more likely than control firms to reverse accruals downwards to the lowest quintile
of accrual errors. However, panel B of both figures show that after Dura, they became less
likely than control firms to do so.
8.2 All accrual error reversals
Finally, the results from estimating Equation 5 are documented at Table 10. From columns
(3) and (6), the significantly positive coe cients on q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt suggest that
accrual error reversals declined after Dura in treatment firms, relative to control firms.
Since both q acct 1 and q acct are quantile bins, a coe cient estimate of  ˆ indicates that
an increase in the explanatory variable from the lowest to the highest quantile is associated
with a  ˆ ⇥ 100 percentage point increase in the outcome variable along its distribution, on
average. From columns (4) and (5), in the pre-Dura period, an increase in starting accruals
from the lowest to the highest quintile decreased ending accruals by 7.5 percentage points
more in treatment than control firms, but in the post-Dura period it decreased it by 10.1
percentage points less.
In untabulated analyses I find that the estimated coe cient on q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt
becomes insignificant and close to zero when I omit firms in the lowest quintile of accrual
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Figure 3: Downward accrual error reversals, treatment-control di↵erence, highest two starting accrual quin-
tiles
This figure illustrates the results documented at Table 8 by plotting the coe cient of I(q acct 1   4)⇥treatt
when Equation 3 is estimated within specific time periods without postt. A coe cient of   implies that the
increase in the odds of a highly negative accrual error when a previous-year accrual error becomes highly
positive is e  times as much in a treatment firm relative to a control firm, on average. Panels A and B
correspond to the results at Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 8, and examine the coe cients within the
Pre-Dura and Post-Dura periods respectively. For Panels C and D I estimate Equation 3 each year without
postt and without year fixed e↵ects.
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Figure 4: Downward accrual error reversals, treatment-control di↵erence, highest starting accrual quintile
This figure illustrates the results documented at Table 9 by plotting the coe cient of I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥treatt
when Equation 4 is estimated within specific time periods without postt. A coe cient of   implies that the
increase in the odds of a highly negative accrual error when a previous-year accrual error becomes highly
positive is e  times as much in a treatment firm relative to a control firm, on average. Panels A and B
correspond to the results at Columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 9, and examine the coe cients within the
Pre-Dura and Post-Dura periods respectively. For Panels C and D I estimate Equation 4 each year without
postt and without year fixed e↵ects.
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Figure 5: Accrual reversals by ending quintile, highest two starting accrual quintiles
These figures plot the percentage of firms with previous-year accrual errors in the highest two quintiles that
are in each quintile of accrual errors in the current year.
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Figure 6: Accrual reversals by ending quintile, highest starting accrual quintile
These figures plot the percentage of firms with previous-year accrual errors in the highest quintiles that are
in each quintile of accrual errors in the current year.
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Table 10: All accrual error reversals
Dependent variable: q acct
Model: Ordinary least squares Weighted least squares
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
q acct 1 ⇥ treatt  0.038 0.103⇤⇤⇤  0.038  0.075⇤⇤ 0.101⇤⇤⇤  0.075⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.037) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034)
q acct 1 0.026  0.083⇤⇤⇤ 0.027 0.061⇤⇤⇤  0.091⇤⇤⇤ 0.062⇤⇤⇤
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020)
treatt 0.107  0.371⇤⇤⇤ 0.115 0.193⇤  0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.187⇤
(0.114) (0.123) (0.114) (0.113) (0.120) (0.112)
q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt 0.141⇤⇤⇤ 0.178⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.050)
q acct 1 ⇥ postt  0.111⇤⇤⇤  0.157⇤⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.030)
postt ⇥ treatt  0.497⇤⇤⇤  0.528⇤⇤⇤
(0.165) (0.165)
postt 0.404⇤⇤⇤ 0.468⇤⇤⇤
(0.102) (0.101)
Year FEs Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Controls & Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,544 3,027 6,571 3,514 2,992 6,506
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.055 0.051 0.058 0.065 0.057
This table shows the results from estimating Equation 5. I estimate the model using
least squares, and use weighted least squares for the propensity-matched regressions. In
columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), I estimate the model for specific time periods. The control
variables are roat, growtht, ebtmt 1, log aget, and log mvt 1, and variable definitions are
at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and the p-values are labeled as
follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
46
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857703 
errors at t. This indicates that the change in overall accruals error reversals after Dura is
driven almost entirely by income-decreasing accruals.
8.3 Additional tests and sensitivity analyses
I next carry out several additional tests and sensitivity analyses that I leave untabulated for
brevity.
As in the write-downs tests (see Section 7.3), I replicate the tests of accrual reversals using
an alternative sample period in which the pre-Dura period is defined as 2003 and 2004, and
the post-Dura period is defined as 2006 and 2007. Under this specification, the coe cients on
I(q acct 1   4)⇥postt⇥ treatt, I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥postt⇥ treatt, and q acct 1⇥postt⇥ treatt
are statistically significant and of comparable economic significance to the corresponding
coe cients in the main analyses (Tables 8, 9, and 10), suggesting that the change in sample
period does not have a substantial e↵ect on my main findings.
Next, I replicate my tests of accrual reversals using an alternative definition of accrual
errors based on the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). Beginning with the final
sample of 6,571 firm-years used in my accrual reversals tests, I further require the availability
of modified Jones accrual errors, and use these in the propensity-matching procedure and
in computing the accrual error quintiles (q acct 1 and q acct) used in the analyses.27 I find
that the accrual errors used in my main tests and accrual errors based on the modified
Jones model are highly correlated, with Pearson correlations of 81 percent for current-year
accruals and 80 percent for previous-year accruals. I find that my primary inferences are
unchanged under this alternative specification. Specifically, all the coe cients of interest—
i.e. the coe cients on I(q acct 1   4⇥ postt ⇥ treatt, I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥ postt ⇥ treatt, and
q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt—remain statistically significant at conventional significance levels
and in the hypothesized directions under both the industry-matching and the propensity-
matching methods.
27As in the methodology in my main tests (see Appendix E), I estimate the modified Jones model with
a scaled intercept within industry-years, scaling each term by average assets. I require the industry-years
to comprise at least ten observations and use only firm-years with average assets of at least $5 million, in
order to reduce the impact of outliers and small sample sizes when estimating the model’s coe cients. I
also winsorize each term at the top and bottom percentile each industry-year. I then merge the estimated
model coe cients for each industry-year back into the data, and compute the accrual estimation error as
the component of accruals not explained by the model.
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9 Falsification tests
9.1 Alternative case on a di↵erent legal issue
I verify that my findings are specific to the ex post loss rule by replicating my analyses using
an alternative Supreme Court decision that also a↵ected barriers to litigation in the Ninth
Circuit, but that concerned a di↵erent legal issue. A finding that barriers to litigation are
positively associated with delays to downward corrections in this setting would suggest an
alternative interpretation of my results: that the increase in delaying after Dura may be
attributable to the increase in barriers to litigation, independent of the adoption of the ex
post loss rule.
I carry out this falsification test using Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551
U.S. 308 (2007). Tellabs is an ideal setting because it a↵ected barriers to litigation in the
Ninth Circuit, but concerned the approach for pleading scienter, a separate issue from the
ex post loss rule and loss causation.28 Choi & Pritchard (2012) found that Tellabs had the
“greatest impact” on the Ninth Circuit: “scienter-based dismissal decreased in the Ninth
Circuit after the Tellabs decision relative to other circuits” (p. 877). In addition, using
Tellabs allows me to carry out the falsification tests within the post-SFAS 142 and post-
Sarbanes Oxley Act regulatory environments.
I replicate my main analyses (Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10) starting the post-period in 2008,
but with otherwise identical methodology. I document the results at Table 11, tabulating
only the main coe cients for brevity. Because Tellabs decreased barriers to litigation in the
Ninth Circuit, finding a decline in delaying of write-downs and downward accrual reversals in
the Ninth Circuit relative to control circuits after Tellabs would suggest that the alternative
interpretation is important in explaining my findings. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 11 document
the estimated coe cients on the triple interactions. All are smaller in magnitude to my
main results, and are statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels, or, in one
case, significant but in the wrong direction to the result that would support the alternative
interpretation.
9.2 Firms not in high-litigation industries
The motivation of this paper is that the ex post loss rule provides managers with the ability
to reduce or avoid losses from securities litigation by delaying corrective disclosures. The rule
28Scienter and loss causation are two of the six di↵erent elements in a securities case, as spelled out by
the Supreme Court in Dura: “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter (a wrongful state of
mind); (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance [...]; (5) economic loss [...]; and
(6) loss causation” (p. 580, internal quotation marks omitted).
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Table 11: Main tests with an alternative Supreme Court decision
Matching: Industry-matched Propensity-matched
Period: Pre Post DID Pre Post DID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Odds of writing down (logistic; dependent variable: wddt)
abtmdt 1 ⇥ treatt 0.010  0.184 0.013  0.314 0.032  0.294
(0.485) (0.273) (0.482) (0.502) (0.272) (0.494)
abtmdt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt  0.166 0.205
(0.550) (0.560)
Observations 2,685 2,340 5,025 2,640 2,305 4,945
McFadden R2 0.065 0.112 0.071 0.070 0.103 0.064
Panel B: Level of write-downs (least squares; dependent variable: wdt)
abtmt 1 ⇥ treatt  0.052 0.021  0.049  0.053  0.005  0.076
(0.032) (0.041) (0.049) (0.033) (0.041) (0.051)
abtmt 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt 0.067 0.073
(0.059) (0.062)
Observations 603 657 1,260 538 620 1,158
Adjusted R2 0.471 0.480 0.473 0.564 0.517 0.516
Panel A: Accrual reversals, top two quintiles (logistic; dependent variable: I(q acct = 1))
I(q acct 1   4)⇥ treatt  0.276  0.439⇤⇤  0.255  0.128  0.654⇤⇤⇤  0.094
(0.199) (0.212) (0.196) (0.201) (0.218) (0.199)
I(q acct 1   4)⇥ postt ⇥ treatt  0.220  0.647⇤⇤
(0.291) (0.294)
Observations 3,179 2,713 5,892 3,148 2,666 5,814
McFadden R2 0.126 0.093 0.107 0.127 0.108 0.112
Panel B: Accrual reversals, top quintile (logistic; dependent variable: I(q acct = 1))
I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥ treatt  0.218  0.288  0.213  0.241  0.561⇤⇤  0.240
(0.226) (0.242) (0.221) (0.229) (0.248) (0.226)
I(q acct 1 = 5)⇥ postt ⇥ treatt  0.125  0.391
(0.330) (0.335)
Observations 3,179 2,713 5,892 3,148 2,666 5,814
McFadden R2 0.132 0.097 0.112 0.134 0.115 0.120
Panel C: Accrual reversals, all reversals (least squares; dependent variable: q acct)
q acct 1 ⇥ treatt 0.048 0.046 0.047 0.021 0.062 0.043
(0.036) (0.039) (0.036) (0.035) (0.040) (0.036)
q acct 1 ⇥ postt ⇥ treatt 0.004  0.011
(0.053) (0.054)
Observations 3,179 2,713 5,892 3,148 2,666 5,814
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.039 0.042 0.061 0.049 0.043
This table shows the results from replicating the main tests of this paper using Tellabs instead of
Dura but with otherwise identical methodology. Specifically, the results documented at Tables 6,
7, 8, 9, and 10 are replicated in Panels A to E respectively. I tabulate only the key coe cients for
brevity. Variable definitions are at Appendix D. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and the
p-values are labeled as follows: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01.
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should therefore only a↵ect companies with su cient securities litigation risk: a hypothetical
firm that has a negligible probability of facing litigation would have no incentive to take a
costly action to avoid litigation.29 Finding a similar or stronger result for firms in industries
with lower litigation risk would therefore call my interpretation of my main results into
question.
I carry out this falsification test by replicating my main analyses (Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10)
using non-financial firms that are not in the set of high-litigation industries that are the focus
of this study, but with otherwise identical methodologies.30 I leave the results untabulated
for brevity. Under both industry matching and propensity matching, the coe cients on the
triple interaction terms are statistically insignificant at conventional significance levels or in
the opposite direction from the corresponding coe cients in my main tests. These results
suggest that there is no evidence that the ex post loss rule a↵ects firms not in highly-litigated
industries.
10 Concluding remarks
“While Dura’s transformative e↵ect has been undeniable, it was only the begin-
ning of the evolution of the significance of loss causation to the application of
securities laws.”
(Sullivan et al., 2010)
Under the ex post loss rule, plainti↵s in securities lawsuits are required to show that the
firm’s alleged misconduct caused a corrective disclosure that resulted in a stock price decline.
Firms at high risk of litigation would therefore be incentivized to avoid or delay bad news in
the hopes of a turnaround or the occurrence of other news that can be bundled with the bad
news (see Spindler, 2007 and Bliss et al., 2018). My overall research question is whether this
applies to the delaying of income-decreasing accounting choices, which would demonstrate
a fundamental link between corrective disclosures in the context of securities litigation, and
downwards corrections of financials as required by GAAP.
My research design exploits the fact that the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura caused the
29Delaying corrective disclosures is potentially costly; for example because they increase potential damages
should the firm be sued eventually (see Section 3.3).
30The high-litigation industries are the biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734); computer
manufacturing and software (SIC 3570–3577 and 7370–7374); electronics manufacturing (SIC 3600–3674);
and telecommunications and electric services (SIC 4810–4813, 4911, and 4931) industries. Please see Ap-
pendix C for further discussion, including details on industry representation in securities lawsuit filings prior
to Dura, and the probability of securities litigation by industry. Financial firms are defined as firms with
SIC codes beginning with six.
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ex post loss rule to be adopted in the Ninth Circuit, when it was already the prevailing legal
standard in the majority of the circuits. I find that after Dura, firms under the jurisdiction
of the Ninth Circuit and in high-litigation industries became more likely to delay GAAP-
required write-downs and income-decreasing reversals of working capital accrual estimation
errors at the firm level, relative to matched control firms. This suggests that the current loss
causation standard in securities litigation a↵ects income-decreasing accounting choices.
In addition, I find that when write-downs do occur, they are larger after Dura relative
to the firm’s beginning book-to-market ratio, in treatment firms relative to control firms.
This is consistent with firms being able to delay write-downs only up to a point, or firms
reporting “as much bad news as possible” (Spindler, 2007, p. 684–685) by recording larger
write-downs or write-downs to more assets in the same period, once they are unable to delay
a write-down. I also find that the impact of Dura on income-decreasing working capital
accrual error reversals is large enough to drive a significant change in overall working capital
accrual error reversals after Dura. Finally, I carry out two falsification tests: the first uses
an alternative Supreme Court decision that also a↵ected litigation in the Ninth Circuit but
that did not concern the ex post loss rule, and the second uses firms not in high-litigation
industries.
This study contributes to the literature on the relationship between the legal environment
and accounting, and in particular to the growing literature on the impact of court rulings
on financial reporting. I believe that this study is informative to policy makers and legal
and accounting practitioners because downward corrections to a company’s financials are
fundamental to GAAP and are useful for example in the detection of fraud (e.g. Dechow
et al., 2012). If, as my findings suggest, the ex post loss rule increases incentives to delay
income-decreasing accounting choices in highly-litigated industries, then this fundamental
feature of the legal environment causes distortions in firms’ financial disclosures.
In the years since Dura, the ex post loss rule and, more generally, loss causation have
continued to be areas of active development. While the rule is now the prevailing legal
standard across all circuit courts, di↵erences continue to develop from time to time between
the circuits in their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s decision, for example in the
standard by which plainti↵s are required to plead a causal relationship between misconduct
and economic loss (see Sullivan et al., 2010). The methods by which plainti↵s show the
economic losses—typically based on event studies—have also been called into question in
the literature (for example, Torchio, 2009, Kaufman & Wunderlich, 2010, and Baker, 2016),
and several Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Dura have been related to loss causation
to varying degrees and have incrementally refined the doctrine (see, for example, Cox, 2013
and Perry & Conover, 2016).
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Amid this rapid development, loss causation is an issue that clearly links securities liti-
gation and financial reporting: financial disclosures can a↵ect prices, and can therefore play
key roles in identifying either ex ante or ex post losses. The goal of this paper is to shed
light on a specific aspect of this link—the relationship between the prevailing ex post loss
rule and the delaying of income-decreasing accounting corrections. More broadly, however,
the continually-developing legal environment and the relationship between litigation and the
incentives of managers, shareholders, and other stakeholders make the intersection of law
and accounting a rich field for further research.
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Appendix A Summary of Broudo and Dura
Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003), henceforth Broudo, was a
securities case heard in the Ninth Circuit that concerned statements made by Dura Phar-
maceuticals, Inc. during the class period April 15, 1997 to February 24, 1998. The Ninth
Circuit ruled in favor of the plainti↵ investors, holding that loss causation is established if
plainti↵ show “that the price on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepre-
sentation” (p. 934). The defendants appealed, and in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 544
U.S. 336 (2005), henceforth Dura, the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, holding
that price inflation is insu cient to establish loss causation.
A.1 Broudo
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. issued several press releases during the class period April 15,
1997 to February 24, 1998 disclosing progress on the clinical trials and FDA application of
its Albuterol Spiros asthma medication delivery device, and indicating favorable sales growth
of its Ceclor CD antibiotic. However, Dura’s stock price fell 47 percent between February
24 and 25, 1998 when it lowered its revenue and EPS guidance due in part to poor sales of
Ceclor CD. Dura also disclosed several months later that its Albuterol Spiros device failed
to receive FDA approval.
Investors sued, alleging that the firm and the individual defendants knew that the state-
ments issued during the class period were untrue. The district court dismissed the lawsuits
in 2000 and 2001 on the basis of loss causation, because the price decline in February 1998
was unrelated to the Albuterol Spiros device; and on the basis of scienter, because it found
insu cient evidence that the statements about Ceclor CD during the class period were false
or made in the knowledge that they were false.31 The plainti↵s appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
In Broudo, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit
generally agreed with the district court’s conclusions on scienter, but disagreed with its
conclusions concerning loss causation. The court said that
“for a cause of action to accrue, it is not necessary that a disclosure and subse-
quent drop in the market price of the stock have actually occurred, because the
injury occurs at the time of the transaction.” (p. 935, emphasis mine)
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plainti↵s succssfully pled loss causation, be-
cause they did plead that Dura Pharmaceutical’s stock price was inflated due to the mis-
31See In re Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation,, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258 (S.D. Cal. 2000)
and In re Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Securities Litigation,, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25907 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
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representations concerning the Albuterol Spiros device. The defendants appealed to the
Supreme Court.
A.2 Dura
In Dura, the Supreme Court identified a split in the circuit courts’ interpretations of loss
causation, finding that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation was unique: “other Courts of
Appeals [...] have rejected the inflated purchase price approach to showing loss causation.”
(p. 338)
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that it is insu cient for investors
to allege that the firm’s stock price was inflated at the time of purchase. Among other
reasons, the Supreme Court said that an objective of securities law is to protect investors
against economic losses caused by misrepresentations. Because an inflated stock price is not
a relevant economic loss, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation “would allow recovery where a
misrepresentation [...] does not proximately cause any economic loss.” (p. 338)
The Supreme Court also expressed agreement with the majority view that a price decline
is required to establish loss causation, noting the plainti↵s’ “failure to claim that Dura’s
share price fell significantly after the truth became known” (p. 347).
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Appendix B Circuit court jurisdictions
This map, reproduced in full from United States Courts (n.d.), shows the jurisdiction of each
U.S. Court of Appeal. The Ninth Circuit, which is the treatment jurisdiction in this paper,
comprises firms located in Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, or Washington.
62
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2857703 
Appendix C High-litigation industries
In my main analyses I focus on firms in highly-litigated industries as of the time of Dura.
I define high-litigation industries using a combination of (1) industry code ranges from the
prior literature, and (2) an examination of securities lawsuit filings prior to Dura.
Figure C.1 documents the share of securities lawsuits filed against firms in non-financial
industries in two time intervals before Dura, focusing on industries with the highest shares—
at least three percent—within each period. Panel A is based on lawsuits filed from the start
of the SCAC’s coverage (1996) to the day before the Dura decision (N = 1, 906), while Panel
B is based on lawsuit filings during the three years prior to the decision (N = 546). The
data and industry classifications are retrieved from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) database.
The industries with the highest representation correspond closely to categorizations of
high-litigation industries used in the the prior literature. While there is some variation be-
tween studies, many classify the biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734); com-
puter manufacturing and software (SIC 3570–3577 and 7370–7374); and electronics manufac-
turing industries (SIC 3600–3674) as high-litigation industries, all of which overlap closely
with the industries in Figure C.1 (see, for example, Francis et al., 1994; Kasznik & Lev,
1995; Field et al., 2005; Krishnan et al., 2011; Kim & Skinner, 2012; and Donelson & Hop-
kins, 2016). I use these industries in my definition of high-litigation industries, and include
telecommunications and electric services (SIC 4810–4813, 4911, and 4931) because, as shown
in Figure C.1, they are highly represented in the sample of securities lawsuits prior to Dura.
Table C.1 examines whether firms in the selected high-litigation industry groups have
significantly higher risk of facing securities lawsuits than firms not in the high-litigation
industries, in two time intervals. I examine the proportion of firms in each industry group
that were sued within a three-year period beginning with the focal year. In Panel A I
examine focal years between 1996 and 2003 because the SCAC’s coverage begins in 1996,
and because 2005 is the final year of the pre-Dura period in my main analyses. In Panel B I
restrict the data to the final three years of the period, 2001–2003, to examine a period with
greater proximity to Dura. As in my main tests, I require the firms to be headquartered
(Compustat: loc) in the United States and located in a state (state) under the treatment or
control jurisdictions, and I omit firms with beginning total assets (at) less than $1 million.
I also omit financial firms with SIC codes beginning with six.
Table C.1 documents that the firms in each of the selected high-litigation industries are
significantly more likely to be sued than firms in non-high-litigation industries, in both of the
time intervals examined. For example, from Panel B (covering 2001 to 2003), biotechnology
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Figure C.1: Industry representation in lawsuit filings pre-Dura
Panels A and B illustrate the share of securities lawsuits filed against firms in non-financial industries in
two periods before Dura respectively, focusing on industries with at least a three percent share within each
period. The lawsuits data is obtained from Stanford Law School’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
(SCAC) database, and the industry names are as defined by the SCAC. I omit industries with the words
“investment”, “bank”, “financial”, “insurance”, or “fund” in their names. Panel A is based on lawsuits filed
from the start of the SCAC’s coverage to the day before the Dura decision (N = 1, 906), and Panel B is
based on lawsuit filings during the three years prior to the decision (N = 546). The SCAC’s coverage began
in 1996.
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firms have a 7.33 percent probability of being sued within a 3-year period, compared to 3.11
percent for firms not in high-litigation industries.32
Table C.1: Probability of litigation by industry
Panel A: Firm-years between 1996 and 2003
Biotech Computers Electronics Telecoms Other Overall
No. of firm-years 3, 386 6, 924 3, 158 2, 351 32, 404 48, 223
Proportion sued 4.84% 8.88% 6.43% 4.47% 2.64% 4.03%
 2 vs. Other 53.48 616.06 142.43 27.02    
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)    
Panel B: Firm-years between 2001 and 2003
Biotech Computers Electronics Telecoms Other Overall
No. of firm-years 1, 268 2, 360 1, 071 823 10, 627 16, 149
Proportion sued 7.33% 8.86% 7.56% 6.20% 3.11% 4.73%
 2 vs. Other 59.08 160.54 57.03 22.70    
(p-value) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%) (< 1%)    
This table compares the probability of litigation in Compustat firm-years in high-litigation
industry groups with that of other firm-years. I document the proportions of firm-years
in each industry group that were sued within the three years beginning with the focal
year. In Panel A I examine Compustat firm-years between 1996 and 2003, and in Panel
B I examine Compustat firm-years between 2001 and 2003. I require the firms to be
headquartered (Compustat: loc) in the United States and located in a state (state) under
the treatment or control jurisdictions. Treatment firms are located in the jurisdiction of the
Ninth Circuit, while control firms are located in the jurisdictions of circuits other than the
Eighth or Ninth Circuits. I omit firms with beginning total assets (at) less than $1 million,
and financial firms with SIC codes beginning with six. The four high-litigation industry
groups are: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833–2836 and 8731–8734); computer manufacturing
and software (SIC 3570–3577 and 7370–7374); electronics manufacturing (SIC 3600–3674);
and telecommunications and electric services (SIC 4810–4813, 4911, and 4931). I obtain
lawsuit filings data from Stanford Law School’s Class Action Clearinghouse database. The
p-values of the chi-squared tests are based on Monte Carlo simulations (Hope, 1968) with
10,000 replicates.
32Several studies classify retail firms as high-litigation (e.g. Francis et al., 1994; Kim & Skinner, 2012)
while others do not (e.g. Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). I do not include these firms: in
untabulated extensions of Panels A and B of Table C.1, I do not find statistically significant evidence that
retail firms (SIC 5200–5961) have greater probabilities of securities litigation than other firms not in highly-
litigated industries, during both pre-Dura periods (p-values 12.1 percent and 26.5 percent respectively).
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Appendix D Variable definitions
Table D.1: Variable definitions
Variable Definition
abtmt 1 Total assets (at) at the end of t   1 divided by the market value of equity plus total
assets minus common equity (csho⇥ prcc f + at  ceq) at the end of t  1.
abtmdt 1 An indicator variable equal to one if abtmt 1 > 1, and zero otherwise.
acct The component of working capital accruals at t that is attributable to estimation error.
See Appendix E for details on the construction of this variable.
ebtmt 1 Common equity (ceq) at the end of t 1 divided by the market value of equity (csho⇥
prcc f) at the end of t  1.
growtht Change in total revenue (revt) during t scaled by total revenue during t  1.
intt 1 Total intangible assets (intan) at the end of t 1 scaled by total assets (at) at the end
of t  1.
log aget The natural logarithm of firm age, defined as t minus the first fiscal year at which the
firm appears in Compustat plus one.
log att 1 The natural logarithm of total assets (at) at end of t  1.
log mvt 1 The natural logarithm of the market value of equity (csho⇥prcc f) at the end of t 1.
postt An indicator variable equal to one if t is after 2005, and zero otherwise.
q acct The quintile of acct relative to its distribution each year.
roat Income before extraordinary items (ib) during t scaled by average assets (at) during t.
treatt An indicator variable equal to one if the firm is located in a state (state) under the
jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit at t, and zero otherwise. See Appendix B for a map
of states by legal jurisdiction.
wdt The level of write-downs during t (wdp+ gdwlip) scaled by the market value of equity
(csho ⇥ prcc f) at the end of t   1. Larger write-downs are coded as more negative
values.
wddt An indicator variable equal to one if the firm took a write-down at t (wdp < 0 or
gdwlip < 0), and zero otherwise.
Unless otherwise stated, variables in parentheses refer to Compustat Fundamentals Annual variable
names.
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Appendix E Accrual estimation errors
In my accrual reversals tests I use acct, a proxy for the estimation error component of work-
ing capital accruals. I construct this variable using a method similar to Allen et al. (2013),
who use the Dechow & Dichev (2002) model as modified by Bushman et al. (2012) to de-
compose accruals into “good accruals”—the component explained by growth and temporary
fluctuation in working capital requirements—and accrual estimation errors.
I model the non-error component of working capital accruals at t as a function of operating
cash flows at t  1, t, and t+ 1, employee growth at t, and sales growth at t, and include a
scaled intercept:
wcat
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= 0
1
a¯t
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+  2
cfot
a¯t
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a¯t
+  4
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+ ✏
(6)
where wcat is working capital accruals (Compustat:  (act  che  lct + dlc + txp)) during
t; cfot is operating cash flow (oancf) during t; empt is the number of employees (emp) at t;
revt is total revenue (revt) during t; and a¯t is average of the starting and ending total assets
(at) at t.
I estimate the coe cients of the model every industry-year, where industries are defined
according to two-digit SIC codes. To reduce the impact of outliers and small sample sizes on
the coe cient estimates, when estimating the coe cients I use only firm-years with average
assets greater than $5 million, require at least ten observations each industry-year, and
winsorize each term at the top and bottom percentiles each industry-year.
I then merge the estimated coe cients  ˆi for each industry-year back into the data,
and compute the accrual estimation error as the component of working capital accruals not
explained by the model:
acct =
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